A theory of filtered enforcement

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volumn 43, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 34-46

  Heyes, Anthony ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Environmental regulation; Monitoring and enforcement

Indexed keywords

ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; INDUSTRIAL REGULATION; MONITORING; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0036355553     PISSN: 00950696     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeem.2000.1172     Document Type: Article

References (27)

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