Cutting environmental penalties to protect the environment

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 60, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 251-265

  Heyes, Anthony G ^a,b,c  

^a OXFORD INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY STUDIES   (United Kingdom)

^b NUFFIELD COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

^c Bentley ^*  (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Economics of liability; Enforcement; Environmental regulation

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030138141     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(95)01531-0     Document Type: Article

References (24)

1. Andreoni, J., 1991, Reasonable doubt and the optimal magnitude of fines: should the penalty fit the crime?, Rand Journal of Economics 22, 385-395.
2. Bebchuk, L.A. and L. Kaplow, 1993, Optimal sanctions and differences in individuals' likelihood of avoiding detection, International Review of Law and Economics 13, 217-224.
3. Becker, G., 1968, Crime and punishment: An economic approach, Journal of Political Economy 76, 169-217.
4. Braithwaite, J., 1982, The limits of economism in controlling harmful corporate conduct, Law and Society Review 16, no. 3.
5. Fiorina, M., 1982, Legislative choice and regulatory forms, Public Choice 39, 33-46.
6. Fiorina, M., 1985, Group concentration and the delegation of authority, in: R.G. Noll, ed., Regulation and the Social Sciences (University of California Press, Berkely, CA).
7. Greenberg, J., 1984, Avoiding tax-avoidance, Journal of Economic Theory 32, 1-13.
8. Harford, J. and W. Harrington, 1992, Penalty leverage reconsidered, Journal of Public Economics 41, 112-119.
9. Harrington, W., 1988, Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted, Journal of Public Economics 37, 29-53.
10. Heyes, A.G., 1994, Environmental enforcement when 'inspectability' is endogenous: A model with overshooting properties, Environmental and Resource Economics 4, 479-494.
11. Kambhu, J., 1989., Regulatory standards, non-compliance and enforcement, Journal of Regulatory Economics 1, 103-114.
12. Keeler, A.G., 1991, Noncompliant firms in transferable discharge permit markets: Some extensions, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 21, 180-189.
13. Kolstad, D., T. Ullen and J. Johnson, 1990, Ex ante regulation vs ex post liability for harm: Substitutes or complements, American Economic Review 80, no. 4.
14. Laffont, J.J. and J. Tirole, 1993, A Theory of Incentives in. Procurement and Regulation (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA).
15. Lenoir, N., 1991, Optimal structure of regulatory agencies facing the threat of political influence, Masters Thesis, MIT, Cambridge, MA.
16. Mookherjee, D. and I.P.L. P'ng, 1992, Monitoring vis-à-vis investigation in the enforcement of law, American Economic Review 82, 556-565.
17. Polinsky, A.M. and S. Shavell, 1979, The optimal trade-off between the probability and magnitude of fines, American Economic Review 69, 880-891.
18. Polinsky, A.M. and S. Shavell, 1991, A note on optimal fines when wealth varies among individuals, American Economic Review 81, 618-621.
19. Polinsky, A.M. and D.L. Rubinfeld, 1991, A model of optimal finds for repeat offenders, Journal of Public Economics 46, 291-306.
20. Ringleb, A.H. and S.N. Wiggins, 1989, Institutional control for large-scale, latent hazards, manuscript, A&M University, College Station, Texas.
21. Ringleb, A.H. and S.N. Wiggins, 1991, Liability and large-scale, long-term hazards, Journal of Political Economy 98, 574-595.
22. Shavell, S., 1992, A note on marginal deterrence, International Review of Law and Economics 12, 133-149.
23. Stigler, G.J., 1970, The optimum enforcement of laws, Journal of Political Economy 78, 526-536.
24. Watabe, A., 1991, On economic incentives for reducing hazardous waste generation, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 23, 154-160.