Imperfect observability of emissions and second-best emission and output taxes

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 85, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 385-407

  Cremer, Helmuth ^a   Gahvari, Firouz ^b  

^a INSTITUT UNIVERSITAIRE DE FRANCE   (France)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

Emissions; Imperfect observability; Taxes

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036318513     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00120-7     Document Type: Article

References (15)

1. Environmental policy, public finance and the labor market in a second-best world
2. Tax evasion and the structure of indirect taxes and audit probabilities
3. Tax evasion and optimal commodity taxation
4. Externalities and optimal taxation
5. Second-best taxation of emissions and polluting goods
6. Incentives for pollution control: Regulation and (?) or (?) information
7. A tax on output of the polluting industry is not a tax on pollution: The importance of hitting the target
8. Compliance and enforcement: Air pollution regulation in the US steel industry
9. The principle of targetting: A comment on externalities and optimal taxation
10. An exploration in the theory of optimal income taxation
11. EPA effectiveness at reducing the duration of plant-level noncompliance
12. A note on the structure of optimal taxation
13. Optimal taxation in the presence of externalities
14. The choice between emission taxes and output taxes under imperfect monitoring
15. The incentive effects of green taxes in the presence of administrative costs