Voluntary pollution reductions and the enforcement of environmental law: An empirical study of the 33/50 program

Journal of Law and Economics

Volumn 51, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 271-296

  Innes, Robert ^a   Sam, Abdoul G ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

^b OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 51349168309     PISSN: 00222186     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/589659     Document Type: Article

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