Political connections, tax benefits and firm performance: Evidence from China

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy

Volumn 31, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 277-300

  Wu, Wenfeng ^a   Wu, Chongfeng ^a   Zhou, Chunyang ^a   Wu, Jun ^b  

^a Shanghai Jiao Tong University   (China)

^b SAVANNAH STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84860990157     PISSN: 02784254     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2011.10.005     Document Type: Article

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