Public governance and corporate finance: Evidence from corruption cases

Journal of Comparative Economics

Volumn 36, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 343-364

  Fan, Joseph P H ^a   Rui, Oliver Meng ^a   Zhao, Mengxin ^b  

^a The Chinese University of Hong Kong   (Hong Kong)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA   (Canada)

Author keywords

Capital structure; China; Corporate finance; Corruption; Public governance; Regulated firms; Rent seeking

Indexed keywords

EID: 50849093538     PISSN: 01475967     EISSN: 10957227     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2008.05.001     Document Type: Article

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