Mistakes in Cooperation: The Stochastic Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting

Economic Journal

Volumn 118, Issue 532, 2008, Pages 1719-1741

  Serrano, Roberto ^a   Volij, Oscar ^b,c  

^a BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c BEN GURION UNIVERSITY OF THE NEGEV   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMICS; PROBABILITY; STOCHASTICITY;

EID: 52749097703     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: 14680297     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02187.x     Document Type: Article

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