Mass torts and due process

Vanderbilt Law Review

Volumn 65, Issue 4, 2012, Pages 1059-1121

  Campos, Sergio J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84860165775     PISSN: 00422533     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (355)

1. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892-93 (2008).
2. (quoting Richards v. Jefferson Cnty., 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996).
3. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999);
4. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989).
5. But see Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the "Day in Court" Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 195-96 (1992) .
6. - 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006) (prohibiting a rule that would "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right");
7. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1443 (2010) (Scalia, J.).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ⋯ be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.").
9. XIV § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.").
10. This Article refers to both Due Process Clauses collectively as the "Due Process Clause," although they do not overlap entirely.
11. See Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 414-15 (2010) (discussing the difference between the two clauses with respect to the law of substantive due process).
12. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985).
13. (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)).
14. Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 160-61 (2003).
15. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2560-61 (2011).
16. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
17. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2559;
18. cf. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173 (1974).
19. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2559;
20. see also MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 169 (2009) ("If ⋯ the autonomy value lies at the normative core of procedural due process, obviously [an] opt-out procedure is constitutionally preferable to the mandatory procedure imposed by Rule 23(b)(1) and (2).").
21. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepción, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011).
22. (citing Phillips Petroleum Co v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985)).
23. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892-93, 901 (2008).
24. see also Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2380-82 (2011).
25. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 520, 576-77 (2010).
26. (citing Sturgell, 533 U.S. at 901).
27. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1443 (2010) (Scalia, J.);
28. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 845 (1999);
29. see also RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 84 (2007).
30. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 821.
31. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626 (1997);
32. John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 386 (2000).
33. See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 852-53 & n.30 (1999);
34. Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, "Sweetheart" and "Blackmail" Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1377-78 & nn.1-2 (2000).
35. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.02 reporters' notes cmt. b(1)(B) (2010)
36. [hereinafter ALI, PRINCIPLES];
37. see also MANUAL OF COMPLEX LITIGATION § 22.7, at 413 (4th ed. 2004).
38. [hereinafter MANUAL];
39. HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 17.2, at 300 (4th ed. 2002);
40. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1783 (3d ed. 1998).
41. Advisory Committee Notes to 1966 Amendments of Rule 23, 39 F.R.D.. 69, 103 (1966).
42. See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 847;
43. Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 530;
44. Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process, and the Right to Opt Out of Class Actions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1065 (2002).
45. quoting Henry Paul Monaghan, Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion Against Absent Nonresident Class Members, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1148, 1174 (1998)).
46. See Lee Anne Fennell, Commons, Anticommons, Semicommons, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 35 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2010).
47. [hereinafter Fennell, Commons];
48. see also ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 7 (1990);
49. Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 907, 913-25 (2004).
50. [hereinafter Fennell, Tragedies];
51. Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 135-44 (2000).
52. See David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A 'Public Law' Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 902-03 (1984).
53. [hereinafter Rosenberg, Causal Connection].
54. See David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have and Plaintiffs Don't, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393, 395 (2000)
55. [hereinafter Rosenberg, What Defendants Have].
56. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977).
57. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976);
58. see also Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 10-18 (1991).
59. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
60. quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
61. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
62. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1437 (2010).
63. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
64. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 622-24 (1997).
65. See Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D.. 69, 103 (1966) (Advisory Committee's note);
66. see also Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 393 (1967).
67. See Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497 (1969).
68. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
69. see also Allan Erbsen, From "Predominance" to "Resolvability": A New Approach to Regulating Class Actions, 58 VAND. L. REV. 995, 1080 (2005);
70. Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805, 831-32 (1997);
71. Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 132 (2009).
72. See Sergio J. Campos, Proof of Classwide Injury, 37 BROOK. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.Com/abstract=1999691.
73. - 521 U.S. 591, 609-10 (1997).
74. quoting Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 626-28 (3d Cir. 1996).
75. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Futures Problem, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1901-02 (2000).
76. Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961, 966 (1993).
77. David Rosenberg, Adding a Second Opt-Out to Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions: Cost Without Benefit, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19, 53 & n.60.
78. STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 129 (1987);
79. David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice By Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561, 588 (1987).
80. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088 (5th Cir. 1973).
81. See In re Bridgestone/Firestone Inc. Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 205 F.R.D.. 503, 520-21 (S.D. Ind. 2001).
82. rev'd 288 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2002).
83. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 358-62 (Ct. App. 1981).
84. See Michael J. Frank, The Social Context Variable in Hostile Environment Litigation, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 437, 519 (2002).
85. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D.. 137, 149 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
86. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547-48 (2011).
87. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)).
88. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977).
89. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552.
90. See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 600-12 (9th Cir. 2010).
91. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2(c) (1998).
92. See DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 8.5 (2005).
93. See, e.g., In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764 (3d Cir. 1992);
94. In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 252 F.R.D.. 83 (D. Mass. 2008).
95. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 472-73 (5th Cir. 1986).
96. Roger L. Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 69, 79;
97. see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(D).
98. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4).
99. In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 145 (2d Cir. 2001).
100. overruled on other grounds by In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006);
101. see Carnegie v. Household Int'l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004).
102. (citing Visa Check, 280 F.3d. at 145).
103. See Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 576, 634-37 (2008).
104. see also In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298-1300 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.).
105. See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 748-49 (5th Cir. 1996);
106. Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659, 688-89 (1989).
107. citing Castano, 84 F.3d at 751;
108. Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1303.
109. U.S. CONST. amend. VII;
110. Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1303;
111. cf. Patrick Woolley, Mass Tort Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Reexamination Clause, 83 IOWA L. REV. 499, 502 (1998).
112. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
113. see also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997).
114. (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)).
115. Carnegie v. Household Int'l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004).
116. Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 686 (1941.
117. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2043, 2057-63 (2010);
118. Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 103-08 (2006);
119. William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation?: A Positive Externalities Theory of the Small Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC L. REV. 709, 715-20 (2006).
120. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 389-418 (2004) (examining the basic theory of litigation).
121. See, e.g., ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 34 (2003).
122. See In re Neurontin Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., 612 F. Supp. 2d 116, 122 (D. Mass. 2009).
123. David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 832 (2002).
124. [hereinafter Rosenberg, Only Option];
125. David Rosenberg, Of End Games and Openings in Mass Tort Cases: Lessons from a Special Master, 69 B.U. L. REV. 695, 695-96 (1989)
126. [hereinafter Rosenberg, End Games];
127. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1442 (2010);
128. Part II.B.2 (discussing exemplary remedies like punitive damages);
129. Part II.C.3 (discussing alternative enforcement procedures in the context of federalism and separation-of-powers concerns).
130. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997).
131. (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)).
132. See Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980).
133. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
134. See Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2531, 2536-38 (2008).
135. See Diane Wood Hutchinson, Class Actions: Joinder or Representational Device?, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 459, 459.
136. See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1443 (2010) (Scalia, J.).
137. See Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 341.
138. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (2003);
139. cf. Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: Aggregation, Amplification, and Distortion, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 475, 488.
140. See David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 921 (1998).
141. See Lee Anne Fennell, Slices and Lumps 2-3 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, No. 211, 2008), available at http://ssrn.Com/abstract=1106421.
142. See FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a);
143. cf. Sprint, 128 S. Ct. at 2541-42.
144. Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 105, 109 (2010).
145. See Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical Implications of Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381, 386-401 (2000).
146. Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 212.
147. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2-15 (1960).
148. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 1625, 1641-49 (2002).
149. See Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 61 (2011).
150. See Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, The Effects of Outlier Presence, Plaintiff Population Size, and Aggregation of Plaintiffs on Simulated Civil Jury Decisions, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 209, 226 (1988).
151. See James D. Cox et al., Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1604-05 (2006).
152. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331-32 (1979);
153. Howard M. Erichson, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 96 MICH. L. REV. 945, 956-57 n.42 (1998);
154. cf. Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 346 (5th Cir. 1982).
155. See Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation: A Real Options Perspective, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1269 (2006).
156. Cf. S. Todd Brown, Specious Claims and Global Settlement, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).
157. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v).
158. But see Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 612 (1997).
159. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1555 (2004).
160. See Michael A. Perino, Class Action Chaos? The Theory of the Core and an Analysis of Opt-Out Rights in Mass Tort Class Actions, 46 EMORY L.J. 85, 96 (1997).
161. But see Edward Brunet, Class Action Objectors: Extortionist Free Riders or Fairness Guarantors, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 403, 403.
162. See David Betson & Jay Tidmarsh, Optimal Class Size, Opt-Out Rights, and "Indivisible Remedies," 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 542, 548 (2011).
163. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Procedural Justice in Nonclass Aggregation, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 11-24 (2009).
164. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 360-61 (Ct. App. 1981).
165. See Part II.B.2 (discussing damage scheduling).
166. See TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, U.S. TORT COSTS: 2002 UPDATE 17 fig. (2002).
167. See Scott Hershovitz, Harry Potter and the Trouble with Tort Theory, 63 STAN. L. REV. 67, 74 (2010).
168. citing JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS (2000).
169. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1244-45 (1968).
170. See, e.g., Gary D. Libecap & James L. Smith, The Economic Evolution of Petroleum Property Rights in the United States, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S589, S590 (2002).
171. See, e.g., Francesco Parisi et al., Duality in Property: Commons and Anticommons, 25 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 578, 583 (2005).
172. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM ET AL., RULES, GAMES, AND COMMON-POOL RESOURCES 14-15 (1994).
173. See Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics and the Law of Property, 24 NOMOS 3, 9 (1982).
174. Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 666 (1998).
175. MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
176. See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265, 313 (2011).
177. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV.
178. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985).
179. citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
180. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940).
181. Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 37-38.
182. See, e.g., Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Scott, 131 S. Ct. 1, 3-4 (2010).
183. citing Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972).
184. But see Mark Moller, Class Action Defendants' New Lochnerism, UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.Com/abstract=1792526.
185. Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 38.
186. citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
187. See Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1153 n.76 (2009).
188. - 521 U.S. 591, 604 (1997).
189. - 527 U.S. 815, 815 (1999).
190. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
191. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 859.
192. see also John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1419, 1431 (2003).
193. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 616 (1997).
194. quoting Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 633 (1996).
195. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 846-47.
196. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985).
197. (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950);
198. see also Logan v. Zimmerman, 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982).
199. (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313)).
200. See, e.g., Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expenses Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673-75 (1999).
201. See Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1044, 1086 (1984).
202. Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 280 (2008).
203. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090-92 (1972).
204. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969);
205. Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 664 (1986);
206. Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 557 (2000).
207. E.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 388 (1971).
208. See Michael Whinston & Ilya Segal, Property Rights 2 (Mar. 23, 2010) (unpublished draft), available at http://ssrn.Com/abstract=1577382;
209. see also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 138-39 (1769).
210. See, e.g., IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS 4-5 (2005);
211. see also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 369-70 (2001).
212. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 319, 331-32 (2008);
213. Catherine Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 363 (2003).
214. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 976-77 (2010).
215. Gregory C. Keating, Is Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress a Freestanding Tort?, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1131, 1134 (2009)
216. See, e.g., Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005).
217. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (3D) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2(c) (1998).
218. See Lee Anne Fennell, Unbundling Risk, 60 DUKE L.J. 1285, 1293-1308 (2011).
219. Town of Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 756 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
220. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 69 (1970).
221. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 400 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
222. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1969).
223. Cf. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 554 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting);
224. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976).
225. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 40-42 (2000).
226. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 715, 771-72 (1996).
227. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
228. See John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 590-96 (2005).
229. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 717 (1976).
230. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986).
231. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expenses Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 674 (1999).
232. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005);
233. see also DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 n.2 (1989).
234. Paul, 424 U.S. at 717.
235. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977).
236. (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
237. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing cases).
238. - 430 U.S. at 672.
239. See Part II.B.2.
240. See Paul, 424 U.S. at 722-35 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
241. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543-44 (1981).
242. overruled by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
243. See Nat'l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 756-57 (2011)
244. (citing Paul v. Davis, and noting that "[i]f outright defamation does not qualify, it is unimaginable that the mere disclosure of private information does").
245. See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 543-44;
246. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 678-80.
247. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n.-R.I. ex. rel. Scigulinsky v. Ret. Bd. of R.I. Emps.' Ret. Sys., 172 F.3d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 1999) (Boudin, J.).
248. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 717 (1976).
249. Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 893 (1999)
250. (noting that Paul v. Davis most likely arose out of a fear of "the wholesale federalization of tort claims," citing sources).
251. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 521, 543-44 (1981).
252. - 472 U.S. 797, 797 (1985).
253. It should be noted, however, that whether a state court proceeding could preclude the claims of out-of-state nonparties is the same issue the Court addressed in Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), which I discuss below.
254. See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process in the Era of the Nationwide Class Action, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035, 2095-96 (2008).
255. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2559 (2011);
256. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepción, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011).
257. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 808-09.
258. FED. R. CIV. P. 22 (providing for interpleader);
259. see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397, & 2361.
260. - 386 U.S. 523, 525-26 (1967).
261. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 809.
262. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2559 (2011).
263. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
264. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
265. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 833-34 (1999).
266. see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
267. See, e.g., Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 413 (5th Cir. 1998).
268. See OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 9 (1978).
269. see Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1832 n.212 (1997).
270. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
271. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Corporate Strategic Reaction to Mass Tort, 72 VA. L. REV. 1 (1986);
272. cf. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 851 (1999).
273. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976);
274. see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970).
275. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
276. Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 11 (1991).
277. See William B. Rubenstein, On What a "Private Attorney General" Is-And Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2142-59 (2004).
278. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164-65 (1978);
279. see also Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1457-61 (2003).
280. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
281. See Robert G. Bone, Securing the Normative Foundations of Litigation Reform, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1155, 1161 (2006);
282. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 441-42 (1973).
283. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 533 (1967).
284. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626 (1997).
285. see also Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
286. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, What Is a Tort Claim? An Interpretation of Contemporary Tort Reform, 51 MD. L. REV. 172, 188 (1992).
287. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: An Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571, 1585 (2004);
288. Overview, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, https://www.Cms.gov/FeeScheduleGenInfo/ (Feb. 22, 2012).
289. See Alexandra Lahav, The Case for "Trial by Formula," 90 TEX. L. REV. 571 (2012).
290. John C. Coffee, Jr., Conflicts, Consent, and Allocation After Amchem Products-Or, Why Attorneys Still Need Consent to Give Away Their Clients' Money, 84 VA. L. REV. 1541, 1550 (1998).
291. Cf. In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D.. 86, 163-64, 194 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
292. See generally A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1998).
293. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298-99 (7th Cir. 1995).
294. (quoting HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 120 (1973).
295. citing John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior, 44 SOC. RES. 623 (1977).
296. citing ADAM SMITH, A THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (1759).
297. noting similarity, citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136 (1971).
298. See, e.g., David A. Dana, Adequacy of Representation after Stephenson: A Rawlsian/Behavioral Economics Approach to Class Action Settlements, 55 EMORY L.J. 279, 282-83 (2006).
299. See Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem With Contrarian Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV. 485, 518-42 (2003).
300. See John Broome, Fairness, 91 PROCS. OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 87, 94 (1990).
301. Bruce L. Hay, Procedural Justice-Ex Ante vs. Ex Post, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1803, 1844 (1997);
302. See JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 158-253 (1985);
303. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973).
304. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892-93 (2008).
305. (quoting Richards v. Jefferson Cnty., 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996);
306. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999).
307. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997).
308. But see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003).
309. quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
310. See CHARLES FRIED & DAVID ROSENBERG, MAKING TORT LAW: WHAT SHOULD BE DONE AND WHO SHOULD DO IT 27 (2003);
311. Owen M. Fiss, The Allure of Individualism, 78 IOWA L. REV. 965, 967 (1993).
312. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989).
313. (citing 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 449, at 417 (2d ed. 1981)).
314. See generally STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987).
315. But see Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1175.
316. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
317. George Rutherglen, Better Late Than Never: Notice and Opt-Out at the Settlement Stage of Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 258, 286 (1996).
318. - 339 U.S. 306, 307-09 (1950).
319. quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
320. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985)
321. citing Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313;
322. see also Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 913 (2000)
323. "[T]he prominent due process precedent Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co⋯).
324. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317-18 (emphasis added).
325. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
326. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 627 (1997).
327. See Bruce L. Hay, Asymmetric Rewards: Why Class Actions (May) Settle for Too Little, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 479, 481 (1997).
328. John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1354-55 (1995).
329. See, e.g., In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 2006).
330. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 371-403 (1978).
331. - 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2010).
332. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 845 (1999).
333. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1432 (2010).
334. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2559 (2011).
335. But see Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 782-87 (9th Cir. 1996).
336. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2561.
337. See Semtek Int'l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 504 (2001);
338. see also Adam N. Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism: Erie and the Rules Enabling Act After Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1131, 1157-61 (2011);
339. cf. 6A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1545 (4th ed. 2010).
340. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79-80 (1938).
341. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474-78 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
342. see also Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1106-12 (1982).
343. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999).
344. See Sergio J. Campos, Erie as a Choice of Enforcement Defaults, 64 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (on file with author).
345. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1465 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
346. quoting Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472.
347. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
348. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940).
349. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318 (1950).
350. See Jennifer S. Hendricks, In Defense of the Substance-Procedure Dichotomy, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 103, 136 (2011).
351. See, e.g., Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227.
352. (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
353. See Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 735 (1975);
354. see also Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 21 (2010).
355. Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980).