Asymmetric rewards: Why class actions (May) settle for too little

Hastings Law Journal

Volumn 48, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 479-

  Hay, Bruce L ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0043266384     PISSN: 00178322     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (3)

1. For some early expressions of concern, see Judge Friendly's cautionary remarks in Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (dissenting opinion), and in Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 900 (2d Cir. 1972), and the insightful observations in Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 57-59 (1975). More recent systematic treatments of the problem include John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991).
2. For some early expressions of concern, see Judge Friendly's cautionary remarks in Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (dissenting opinion), and in Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 900 (2d Cir. 1972), and the insightful observations in Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 57-59 (1975). More recent systematic treatments of the problem include John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991).
3. For some early expressions of concern, see Judge Friendly's cautionary remarks in Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (dissenting opinion), and in Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 900 (2d Cir. 1972), and the insightful observations in Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 57-59 (1975). More recent systematic treatments of the problem include John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991).