Fair computation with rational players

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 7237 LNCS, Issue , 2012, Pages 81-98

  Groce, Adam ^a   Katz, Jonathan ^a,b  

^a Institute of Advanced Computer Science   (United States)

^b NSF   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARBITRARY FUNCTIONS; GAME-THEORETIC; IDEAL WORLDS; IMPOSSIBILITY RESULTS; TWO-PARTY COMPUTATION;

CRYPTOGRAPHY; GAME THEORY;

RATIONAL FUNCTIONS;

EID: 84859972604     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_7     Document Type: Conference Paper

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