Towards a game theoretic view of secure computation

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 6632 LNCS, Issue , 2011, Pages 426-445

  Asharov, Gilad ^a   Canetti, Ran ^b   Hazay, Carmit ^c  

^a BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^b TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^c AARHUS UNIVERSITY   (Denmark)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

NASH EQUILIBRIA; SECURE COMPUTATION; SIMULATION-BASED; TWO-PARTY PROTOCOLS;

GAME THEORY;

CRYPTOGRAPHY;

EID: 79957983000     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-20465-4_24     Document Type: Conference Paper

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