Sequential rationality in cryptographic protocols

Proceedings - Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 623-632

  Gradwohl, Ronen ^a   Livne, Noam ^b   Rosen, Alon ^c  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE   (Israel)

^c INTERDISCIPLINARY CENTER   (Israel)

Author keywords

Cryptography; Game theory

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATION THEORY; GAME THEORY;

COMPUTATIONAL SOLUTIONS; CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA; CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS; CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY; NASH EQUILIBRIA; NON-TRIVIAL; RATIONAL CRYPTOGRAPHIES; SOLUTION CONCEPTS;

CRYPTOGRAPHY;

EID: 78751541044     PISSN: 02725428     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/FOCS.2010.65     Document Type: Conference Paper

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