Stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 75, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 372-401

  Staudigl, Mathias ^a  

^a BIELEFELD UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Equilibrium selection; Evolutionary game theory; Stochastic stability

Indexed keywords

EID: 84859927475     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.11.003     Document Type: Article

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