Overcomingabsolute primacy: Respect for national identity under the lisbon treaty

Common Market Law Review

Volumn 48, Issue 5, 2011, Pages 1417-1454

  von Bogdandy, Armin ^a   Schill, Stephan ^a  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW   (Germany)

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EID: 84858811925     PISSN: 01650750     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (171)

1. On primacy under the Constitutional Treaty, see Kwiecień, "The Primacy of European Union Law over National Law under the Constitutional Treaty", (2005) German Law Journal (GLJ), 1479
2. Kumm and Ferreres Comella, "The Primacy Clause of the Constitutional Treaty and the Future of Constitutional Conflict in the European Union", (2005) International Journal of Constitutional Law (I.CON), 473.
3. Ritleng, "Le principe de primauté du droit de l'Union", 41 RTDE (2005), 285
4. Kadelbach, "Vorrang und Verfassung: Das Recht der Europäischen Union im innerstaatlichen Bereich", in Gaitanides, Kadelbach, Rodríguez Iglesias (Eds.), Europa und seine Verfassung - Liber Amicorum Manfred Zuleeg (Nomos, 2005), p. 219.
5. Member States have only accepted, in a Declaration to the Lisbon Treaty, the primacy of EU law over the law of Member States "in accordance with well settled case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union", recalling Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, [1964] ECR 1251. See Declaration 17 of the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference, O.J. 2008, C 115/344. This has not prevented domestic constitutional courts from retaining constitutional limits to the primacy of EU law under the reformed European treaties. See, above all, Decisions of the German Federal Constitutional Court: Lisbon (BVerfGE) 123, 267, 353 et seq.
6. (English translation at) (2009).
7. Honeywell (BVerfGE), Decision of 6 July 2010, (2010) NJW, 3422, 3423 et seq. (English translation at ).
8. Not all Member States have specialized constitutional jurisdiction. Instead, the supreme courts in some Member States also exercise constitutional jurisdiction. In the following, for purposes of simplification we will refer summarily to domestic constitutional courts or constitutional courts of Member States, which for our purposes encompasses the supreme courts of Member States to the extent they exercise constitutional jurisdiction.
9. Most recently, Case C-409/06, WinnerWetten, judgment of 8 Sept. 2010, nyr, paras 53 et seq. On the primacy of EU law in relation to the constitutional law of Member States see Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, [1970] ECR 1125, para 3; Case 106/77, Simmenthal, [1978] ECR 629, paras. 21 et seq.; Case 149/79, Commission v. Belgium [1980] ECR 3881, para 19; Joined Cases C-46 & 48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame II, [1996] ECR I-1029, para 33; Case C-473/93, Commission v. Luxemburg, [1996] ECR I-3207, paras. 37 et seq.; Joined Cases C-10-22/97, IN.CO.GE.'90 et al, [1998] ECR I-6307, paras. 11, 20 et seq.; Case C-285/98, Tanja Kreil, [2000] ECR I-95, paras. 25 et seq.; Case C-213/07, Michaniki, [2008] ECR I-9999, paras. 62 et seq.
10. For discussion on the primacy of EU law and the relationship between the ECJ and national constitutional courts see Grabenwarter, "National Constitutional Law Relating to the European Union", in von Bogdandy and Bast (Eds.), Principles of European Constitutional Law, 2nd ed. (Hart, 2010), p. 83.
11. Huber, "Offene Staatlichkeit: Vergleich", in von Bogdandy, Cruz Villalón and Huber (Eds.), Handbuch Ius Publicum Europaeum, Vol. II (Müller Verlag, 2008), § 26 paras. 34 et seq.
12. Albi, "Supremacy of EC Law in the Member States", 3 EuConst (2007), 25
13. Mayer, Kompetenzüberschreitung und Letztbegründung (Beck, 2000), p. 76 et seq.
14. Slaughter, Sweet Stone and Weiler (Eds.), The European Court and National Courts - Doctrine and Jurisprudence (Hart, 1998).
15. Grewe and Ruiz Fabri, Droits constitutionnels européens (P.U.F., 1995), p. 118 et seq.
16. Cartabia, deWitte and PérezTremps (Eds.), Constitución europea y constituciones nacionales (Tirant lo Blanch, 2005).
17. Bosco, "La primauté du droit communautaire dans les ordres juridiques des Etats membres de l'Union européenne", in Due, Ole, Lutter, Marcus and Schwarze (Eds.), Festschrift für Ulrich Everling (Nomos, 1995), p. 149.
18. Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law. The Making of an International Rule of Law in Europe (OUP, 2001).
19. Celotto and Groppi, "Diritto UE e diritto nazionale: Primauté vs controlimiti", (2004) Riv. ital. dir. pubb. Com., 1309.
20. Claes, The National Courts' Mandate in the European Constitution (Hart, 2006), p. 387 et seq.
21. See Maduro, "Contrapunctual Law: Europe's Constitutional Pluralism in Action", in Walker (Ed.), Sovereingty in Transition (Hart, 2003), p. 501.
22. Walker, "The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism", (2002) MLR, 317
23. Kumm, "Who is the Final Arbiter of Constitutionality in Europe?: Three Conceptions of the Relationship between the German Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice", 36 CML Rev. (1999), 351.
24. From a comparative perspective with the constitutional order of the United States: Halberstam, "Constitutional Hierarchy: The Centrality of Conflict in the European Union and the United States", in Dunoff and Trachtman (Eds.), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance (Cambridge U.P., 2009), p. 326.
25. Pernice, Das Verhältnis europäischer zu nationalen Gerichten im europäischen Verfassungsverbund (de Gruyter, 2006), p. 56.
26. For a similar understanding of Art. 4(2) TEU as the one presented here see Besselink, "National and Constitutional Identity before and after Lisbon", (2010) Utrecht Law Review, 36.
27. Pernice, "Der Schutz nationaler Identität in der Europäischen Union", 136 AöR (2011), 185
28. See Peters, Elemente einer Theorie der Verfassung (Duncker & Humblot, 2001), pp. 215-228, 253-255.
29. Franchini, "Les notions d'administration indirecte et de coadministration", in Auby and Dutheil de la Rochère (Eds.), Droit Administratif Européen (Bruylant, 2007), p. 245, 252 et seq.
30. Goldmann, "Der Widerspenstigen Zähmung, oder: Netzwerke dogmatisch gedacht", in Boysen et al. (Eds.), Netzwerke (2007), p. 225.
31. For a similar view outside Germany see Besselink, A Composite European Constitution (Europa Law Publishing, 2007)
32. Pernice, "Theorie und Praxis des Europäischen Verfassungsverbundes", in Calliess (Ed.), Verfassungswandel im europäischen Staaten- und Verfassungsverbund (Mohr Siebeck, 2007), p. 61.
33. Over time, however, the Verbund concept was freed from these competing interpretations and further developed in light of pluralistic understandings
34. See Schönberger, "Die Europäische Union als Bund", 129 AöR (2004), 81
35. Schmidt-Aßmann, "Einleitung: Der Europäische Verwaltungsverbund und die Rolle des Europäischen Verwaltungsrechts", in Schmidt-Aßmann and Schöndorf-Haubold (Eds.), Der Europäische Verwaltungsverbund (Mohr Siebeck, 2005), p. 1, 6 et seq.
36. Voßkuhle, "Multilevel Cooperation of the European Constitutional Courts: Der Europäische Verfassungsgerichtsverbund", 6 EuConst (2010), 175, 183-184
37. Pernice himself, however, translates the term "Verfassungsverbund" by making use of the term multilevel constitutionalism
38. See Pernice, "Multilevel Constitutionalism in the European Union", 5 EL Rev. (2002), 511.
39. The French translation, by contrast, makes reference to the composite constitution
40. Pernice and Mayer, "De la constitution composée de l'Europe", 36 RTDE (2000), 623
41. For a critical view see Galetta, "Coamministrazione, reti di amministrazioni, Verwaltungsverbund: modelli organizzativi nuovi o alternative semantiche alla nozione di 'cooperazione amministrativa' dell'Article 10 TCE, per definire il fenomeno dell'amministrazione intrecciata?" (2009) Rivista italiana di diritto pubblico comunitario, 1689
42. della Cananea, "Is European constitutionalism really 'multilevel'?", (2010) ZaöRV, 283
43. Other constitutional texts are less explicit in this respect, but similar safeguards have been developed in constitutional adjudication, see infra 3.2.
44. See the clarification in relation to a federal reading Pernice, "Europawissenschaft oder Staatsrechtslehre?", in Schulze-Fielitz (Ed.), Staatsrechtslehre als Wissenschaft, Die Verwaltung, Supplement 7 (2007), p. 225 et seq.
45. However, it needs to be noted that the ECJ understood the duty of loyalty in Art. 10 EC as an expression of a general principle of law and applied it not only to the Member States but also to the organs of the EU. See Case 230/81, Luxembourg v. Parliament, [1983] ECR 255 paras. 37 et seq.; Case 2/88 Imm., Zwartveld, [1990] ECR I-3365, para 17; Case C-94/00, Roquêtte Frères, [2002] ECR I-9011, para 31; Case C-275/00, First und Franex, [2002] ECR I-10943, para 49; Case C-339/00, Ireland v. Commission, [2003] ECR I-11757, para 71; Case C-45/07, Commission v. Greece, [2009] ECR I-701, para 25.
46. The duty of loyality thus imposed on the EU also included the duty to respect basic constitutional values
47. See Giegerich, Europäische Verfassung und deutsche Verfassung im transnationalen Konstitutionalisierungsprozeß (2003), p. 792 et seq.
48. Hilf, "Europäische Union und nationale Identität der Mitgliedstaaten", in Randelzhofer, Scholz andWilke (Eds.), Gedächtnisschrift für Eberhard Grabitz (1995), p. 157, 167 et seq.
49. Kahl, in Calliess and Ruffert, EUV/EGV, 3rd ed. (2007), Art. 10 EGV, paras. 70 et seq. (with further references).
50. Case C-208/09, Sayn-Wittgenstein, judgment of 22 Dec. 2010, nyr, paras. 81 et seq.
51. See infra section 3.2.
52. Opinion of A.G.Trstenjak, Case C-324/07, Coditel Brabant, [2008] ECR I-8457, paras. 85 et seq.
53. A.G. Maduro in Case C-135/08, Rottmann, judgment of 30 Sept. 2009, nyr, Opinion at paras. 23 et seq.
54. Case C-112/00, Schmidberger, [2003] ECR I-5659, paras. 71 et seq.
55. For commentary on this decision see Brown, 40 CML Rev. (2003), 1499.
56. Case C36/02, Omega, [2004], ECR I-9609, paras. 33 et seq. For commentary on this decision see Ackermann, 42 CML Rev. (2005), 1107.
57. Case C-438/05, Viking, [2007] ECR I-10779, paras. 45 et seq., 75 et seq.; Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri, [2007] ECR I-11767, paras. 87 et seq.
58. Case C-368/95, Familiapress, [1997] ECR I-3689, para 18; Case C-250/06, United Pan-Europe Communications Belgium et al., [2007] ECR I-11135, paras. 41 et seq.
59. Case C-244/06, Dynamic Medien, [2008] ECR I-505, paras. 36 et seq.
60. Wahl, "Europäisierung: Die miteinander verbundene Entwicklung von Rechtsordnungen als ganzen", in Trute, Groß, Röhl and Möllers (Eds.), Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht - zur Tragfähigkeit eines Konzepts (2008), p. 869.
61. See further Frankenberg, Staatstechnik (2010), pp. 61 et seq.
62. See Verdross and Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht, 3rd ed. (1984), p. 25 et seq.
63. Shaw, International Law, 6th ed. (2008), p. 21 et seq.
64. Combacau and Sur, Droit international public, 8th ed. (2008), p. 236 et seq.
65. CONV 375/02, 10 et seq. For the designation of the clause as "Christophersen-Clause" CONV 251/02, 3.
66. CONV 400/02, 13
67. See (last visited 19 Jan. 2010).
68. See also Toggenburg, "'United in Diversity': Searching for the Regional Dimension in the Context of a Somewhat Foggy Constitutional Credo", in Toniatti, Dani and Palermo (Eds.), An Ever More Complex Union, (2004), p. 27.
69. The mottowas mentioned inArt. I-8(3)TCE,O.J. 2004, C 310/1, as one of the "symbols of the Union". 16 Member States have declared this motto as representing for them a symbol of the sense of community of the people in the European Union and their allegiance to it. See Declaration 52 Annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference, O.J. 2008, C 115/355.
70. These aspects were seen by some as being covered by Art. 6(3) TEU (Amsterdam version).
71. See Uhle, FreitlicherVerfassungsstaat und kulturelle Identität (Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 474 et seq
72. Bleckmann, "Die Wahrung der 'nationalen Identität' im Unions-Vertrag", 52 JZ (1997), 265, 269
73. For a similar understanding of constitutional identity from the perspective of German constitutional law see Kirchhof, "Die Identität der Verfassung", in Isensee and Kirchhof (Eds.), Handbuch des Staatsrechts,Vol. II (3rd ed. 2004), § 21 paras. 64 et seq.
74. Meanwhile the duty to respect cultural and linguistic diversity is contained in Art. 3(3)(4) TEU, but not in Art. 4(2) TEU.
75. See also Puttler, in Calliess and Ruffert, EUV/AEUV, 4th ed. (2011), Art. 4 EUV, para 14 (changing her former view, see note 46).
76. The English version of Art. 4(2) TEU talks about "national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional", the French about "identité nationale, inhérente à leurs structures fondamentales politiques et constitutionnelles".
77. Schmidt, "Identität. Gebrauch und Geschichte eines modernen Begriffs", Muttersprache (1976), 333 et seq.
78. Collins, English Dictionary, 4th ed. (1999), p. 767.
79. In more detail von Bogdandy, "Europäische und nationale Identität: Integration durch Verfassungsrecht?", (2003) Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer, 156
80. von Bogdandy, "The European Constitution and European Identity", (2005) I.CON, 295.
81. See alsoWeber, EuropäischeVerfassungsvergleichung (Beck, 2010), p. 429 et seq.
82. BVerfGE 6, 309, 338, 363 et seq. (1957); 36, 1, 15 et seq. (1973).
83. See also Kunz, "Identity of States under International Law", 49 AJIL (1955), 68
84. Erikson, "Identity, psychosocial", in Sills (Eds.), International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 7 (1968), p. 61.
85. Tugendhat, Selbstbewußtsein und Selbstbestimmung, 6th ed. (Suhrkamp, 1997), p. 283.
86. See Dierse and Rath, "Nation, Nationalismus, Nationalität", in Ritter and Gründer (Eds.), Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Vol. 6 (1984), p. 406.
87. Dellavalle, Una costituzione senza popolo? (2002), p. 94 et seq.
88. Von Bogdandy, "Hegel und der Nationalstaat", (1991) Der Staat, 513
89. Comprehensively from a European constitutional perspective Hanschmann, Der Begriff der Homogenität in der Verfassungslehre und Europarechtswissenschaft (2008)
90. Thus the well-known, albeit ambivalent, metaphor of Renan, Qu'est-ce qu'une nation? (1882), Chapter 3, available at (last visited 19 Jan. 2010).
91. Cf. also Morlok, Selbstverständnis als Rechtskriterium (Mohr, 1993), p. 34 et seq.
92. In more detail Wendel, "Lisbon Before the Courts: Comparative Perspective", 7 EuConst (2011), 96, 134-135
93. This also excludes the topos of "constitutional pre-conditions" (Verfassungsvoraussetzungen), which plays an important role in the discussion in Germany, i.e. conditions for the existence of a national constitution that are not directly enshrined in them, as part of national identity.
94. See also Geiger, in Geiger, Khan and Kotzur, EUV/AEUV Kommentar, 5th ed. (2010), Art. 4 EUV, para 3.
95. Epiney, "Zur Tragweite des Art. 10 EGV im Bereich der Außenbeziehungen", in Bröhmer, Bieber, Calliess, Langenfeld, Weber and Wolf (Eds.), Internationale Gemeinschaft und Menschenrechte - Festschrift für Georg Ress (2005), p. 441, 446.
96. Di Salvatore, L'identità costituzionale dell'Unione europea e degli Stati membri (Giappichelli, 2008), p. 35 et seq.
97. In depth, Wendel, Permeabilität im europäischen Verfassungsrecht (forthcoming 2011)
98. Similarly, Art. 197 Belgian Constitution, Art. 89(5) French Constitution, Art. 110(1) Greek Constitution, Art. 139 Italian Constitution, Art. 115 Luxembourgian Constitution, Art. 9(2) Czech Constitution, and Art. 182(1) Cypriot Constitution.
99. See also Art. 162 Estonian Constitution, Art. 77 Latvian Constitution, Art. 148(1) Lithuanian Constitution, Art. 235(6) Polish Constitution Art. 168 Spanish Constitution or Art. 44(3) Austrian Constitution. Pursuant to these provisions, additional procedural steps are necessary in order for certain constitutional amendments to take effect, such as holding a referendum (e.g. Art. 44(3) Austrian Constitution) or holding new elections so that the newly composed parliament can approve the constitutional amendments voted on by the parliament in its prior composition (e.g. Art. 168 Spanish Constitution).
100. Weber, "Die Europäische Union unter Richtervorbehalt?", 65 JZ (2010), 157
101. Sadurski, "'Solange, chapter 3': Constitutional Courts in Central Europe - Democracy - European Union", 14 ELJ (2008), 1
102. Primacy of EU law is rejected by the Polish Constitutional Court, Case K 18/04, Judgment of 11 May 2005, 41 EuR (2006), 236, 238 et seq., and the Lithuanian Constitutional Court, joined cases 17/02, 24/02, 06/03, 22/04, Judgment of 14 Mar. 2006, Section III, para 9.4, available at (last visited 19 Jan. 2010).
103. More in depth on the position of the Polish Constitutional Court Kowalik-Bańczyk, "Should we Polish it up? The Polish Constitutional Tribunal and the Idea of Supremacy of EU Law", (2005) GLJ, 1357. The situation with regard to the Greek Council of State is unclear.
104. Maganaris, "The Principle of Supremacy of Community Law in Greece", 24 EL Rev. (1999), 426.
105. Italian Constitutional Court, Case 183/1973, Judgment of 18 Dec. 1973, 1/2 EuGRZ (1975), 311, 315 - Frontini.
106. Case 170/84, Judgment of 8 June 1984 - Granital, in Oppenheimer (Ed.), The Relationship between European Community Law and National Law, Vol. I (Cambridge U.P., 1994), p. 643, 651.
107. On the relationship between constitutional law and EU law from the perspective of Italian courts see La Pergola and Del Duca, "Community Law, International Law and the Italian Constitution", 79 AJIL (1985), 598
108. Valaguzza, "La teoria dei controlimiti nella giurisprudenza del Consiglio di Stato", (2006) Rivista trimestrale di diritto processuale amministrativo, 816
109. Tizzano, "Der italienische Verfassungsgerichtshof (Corte costituzionale) und der Gerichtshof der Europäischen Union", 37 EuGRZ (2010), 1
110. BverfGE 37, 271, 277 et seq. (1974) (Solange I); 73, 339, 378 et seq. (1986) (Solange II); 89, 155, 188 (1993) (Maastricht/Brunner); 123, 267, 353 et seq. (2009) (Lisbon decision).
111. Crotty v. An Taoiseach, [1987] IR 173; Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan, [1989] IR 753; Attorney General v. X, [1992] 1 IR 1.
112. Danish Supreme Court, Case I 361/1997 of 6 Apr. 1998, EuGRZ (1999), 49, 52.
113. See further Danielsen, "One of Many National Constraints on European Integration: Section 20 of the Danish Constitution", 16 EPL (2010), 181
114. On the development of the jurisprudence of the Spanish Constitutional Court see Alonso García, "The Spanish Constitution and the European Constitution: The Script for a Virtual Collision and Other Observations on the Principle of Primacy", (2005) GLJ, 1001
115. Alonso Garcia, "Constitución española y Constitución europea", (2005) Revue des Affaires Européennes, 105
116. Castillo de la Torre, case note in 42 CML Rev. (2005), 1169.
117. Plaza, "The Constitution for Europe and the Spanish Constitutional Court", 12 EPL (2006), 353
118. Schutte, "Tribunal Constitucional on the European Constitution. Declaration of 13 Dec. 2004", 1 EuConst (2005), 281.
119. See e.g. French Constitutional Council, Case No. 2006-540 DC, Judgment of 27 July 2006, Recueil des décisions (2006), 88, 92.
120. In more detail on the situation in France, see Pinon, "L'effectivité de la primauté du droit communautaire sur la Constitution", 44 RTDE (2008), 263
121. Hervouët, "Les relations entre ordre juridique communautaire et ordres juridiques nationaux", in Aubin, Blumann, Boiteau and Agostini (Eds.), Le droit administratif: permanences et convergences - mélanges en l'honneur de Jean-François Lachaume (2007), p. 649.
122. Richards, "The Supremacy of Community Law before the French Constitutional Court", 31 EL Rev. (2006), 499.
123. Czech Constitutional Court, Case Pl. ÚS 50/04, Judgment of 8 Mar. 2006; Case Pl. ÚS 66/04 of 3 May 2006, para 53.
124. Case Pl. ÚS 19/08, Judgment of 22 Nov. 2008, para 120, available at .
125. Case Pl. ÚS 29/09, Judgment of 3 Nov. 2009, para 150, 37 EuGRZ (2010), 209, 229.
126. See Polish Constitutional Court, Case K 18/04, Judgment of 11 May 2005, 41 EuR 2006, 236, 243 et seq
127. Case Kp 3/08, Judgment of 18 February 2009, available at .
128. The situation in Lithuania is similar. Thus, the Lithuanian Constitutional Court has already submitted a request for a preliminary ruling to the ECJ: see Case C-239/07, Sabatauskas, [2008] ECR I-7523.
129. Case 2010-605 DC, Judgment of 12 May 2010, para 18, available at (translation by the authors).
130. Latvian Constitutional Court, Case 2008-35-01, Judgment of 7 Apr. 2009, para 17, available at .
131. Czech Constitutional Court, Case Pl. ÚS 50/04, Judgment of 8 Mar. 2006; Latvian Constitutional Court, Case 2008-35-01, Judgment of 7 Apr. 2009, para 17.
132. Czech Constitutional Court, Case Pl. ÚS 50/04, Judgment of 8 Mar. 2006; Latvian Constitutional Court, Case 2008-35-01, Judgment of 7 Apr. 2009, § 17.
133. Czech Constitutional Court, Case Pl ÚS 19/08, Judgment of 22 Nov. 2008, paras. 110 and 196.
134. BverfGE 92, 203, 237 (1995) (EC-TV Directive)
135. Czech Constitutional Court, Case Pl. ÚS 50/04, Judgment of 8 March 2006; Case Pl. ÚS 66/04, Judgment of 3 May 2006, para 53.
136. Czech Constitutional Court, Case Pl ÚS 19/08 of 22 Nov. 2008, para 208.
137. Czech Constitutional Court, Case Pl ÚS 19/08 of 22 Nov. 2008, paras. 135, 186.
138. Polish Constitutional Court, Case P 1/05 of 27 Apr. 2005, see the summary at .
139. Czech Constitutional Court, Case Pl. ÚS 66/04 of 3 May 2006, paras. 61 et seq.
140. Czech Constitutional Court, Case Pl ÚS 19/08 of 22 Nov. 2008, paras. 98 et seq.
141. Latvian Constitutional Court, Case 2008-35-01 of 7 Apr. 2009, para 17.
142. Czech Constitutional Court, Case Pl ÚS 19/08 of 22 Nov. 2008, para 98.
143. BVerf, Decision of 2 Mar. 2010, 63 NJW (2010), 833, 839 (Data Retention).
144. See also Kaiser, "German Data Retention Provisions Unconstitutional in their Present Form; Decision of 2 Mar. 2010, NJW 2010, p. 833", 6 EuConst (2010), 503.
145. Accordingly, the breadth of the control undertaken under the identity control test as well as the fact that the Court deduces the content of constitutional limits from the Constitution's "eternity clause" are regularly criticized
146. For critical discussion of the decision see e.g. Halberstam and Möllers, "The German Constitutional Court Says 'Ja zu Deutschland!'", 10 GLJ (2009), 1241.
147. Kottmann andWohlfahrt, "Der gespaltene Wächter? - Demokratie, Verfassungsidentität und Integrationsverantwortung im Lissabon-Urteil", 69 ZaöRV (2009), 443
148. Tomuschat, "Lisbon - Terminal of the European Integration Process?", 70 ZaöRV (2010), 251
149. Everling, "Europas Zukunft unter der Kontrolle der nationalen Verfassungsgerichte", 45 EuR (2010), 91
150. For a critical, but more reconciliatory reading of the decision see Thym, "In the Name of Sovereign Statehood:A critical Introduction to the Lisbon Judgment of the German Constitutional Court", 46 CML Rev. (2009), 1795.
151. The duty to respect in Arts. 7, 11(2), 13(2), 22, 25, 26, 34(1), 34(3), 36, 48(2) Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) allows proportional interferences with the protected rights (Art. 52(1) CFR).
152. An exception applies, however, in respect ofArt. 1 CFR, Borowsky, in Meyer (Ed.), Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union, 2nd ed. (2006), Art. 1, para 40.
153. See also Declaration no. 20 on Art. 16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union C 115/355, which mentions in connection with the protection of national security that "due account will have to be taken of the specific characteristics of the matter". A parallel to the respect of human dignity can therefore not be drawn.
154. The term "Konkordanz" or "praktische Konkordanz" was coined by the German constitutional law scholar Konrad Hesse and refers to a concept or method of reconciliation and balancing of competing fundamental rights. In a case where two fundamental rights collide, "Konkordanz" requires that both rights be reconciled without giving up either one of them. What this concept primarily excludes is perceiving one of the fundamental rights as superior to any other such right. Instead both rights have to be reconciled in a differentiated manner, a task that is achieved in the fundamental rights context by balancing the different rights and interests under a comprehensive proportionality methodology while aiming at a solution that gives both rights effective protection to the greatest possible extent.
155. See Hesse, Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 20th ed., (Müller, 1995), para 72.
156. A similar argument was raised by Germany Case C-518/07, Commission v. Germany, judgment of 9 March 2010, nyr, paras. 38 et seq., 52 et seq., when it argued that the requirement under Art. 28(1)(2) of Directive 95/46/EC (O.J. 1995, L 281/31) to set up a public authority that exercises monitoring functions in regard of data protection with "complete independence" breached the principle of democracy. In this case, however, Germany did not frame its argument as a question of national identity, but instead as one of respect for the principle of democracy under EU law and respect for well-established national arrangements and the organization and working of Member States' legal systems. Accordingly, the Court did not need to comment on a potential clash between the directive and the domestic understanding of the principle of democracy, and hence the impact of a duty to respect national identity.
157. Case C-165/08, Commission v. Poland, [2009] ECR I-6843, paras. 51.
158. von Danwitz, Europäisches Verwaltungsrecht (Springer, 2008), 153
159. On the international law concept of "self-judging clauses" see Schill and Briese, "'If the State considers': Self-judging clauses in international dispute Settlement", (2009) Max Planck UNYB, 61, 67 et seq
160. On the concept of public policy see Case 41/74, van Duyn [1974] ECR 1337, para 7
161. On public security see Case C-54/99, Église de scientologie, [2000] ECR I-1335, para 17
162. Cf. in the context of defining the concepts of public order and security Case 36/75, Rutili, [1975] ECR 1219, paras. 26 et seq.; Case 30/77, Bouchereau, [1977] ECR 1999, paras. 33/35.
163. Case C-33/07, Gheorghe Jipa, [2008] ECR I-5157, para 23. On the concept of public morality see Case 34/79, Henn v. Derby, [1979] ECR 3795, para 15.
164. The ECJ has the necessary powers to ensure that such information is submitted. See Art. 24 of the Statute of the Court.
165. Similarly Wahl, "Die Schwebelage im Verhältnis von Europäischer Union und Mitgliedstaaten", 48 Der Staat (2010), 587, 603 et seq
166. Constitutional courts of various Member States have in fact already made use of this possibility. See Opinion of A.G. Kokott, Case C-169/08, Presidente del Consiglio, [2009] ECR I-10821, para 21.
167. Spanish Constitutional Court, Case No. 6922-2008, Decision, 9 July 2011, available via .
168. See also Joined Cases C-188 & 189/10, Melki and Abdeli, judgment of 22 June 2010 nyr, para 54 (stressing that "an interlocutory procedure for the review of the constitutionality of a national law, the content of which merely transposes the mandatory provisions of a European Union directive, cannot undermine the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice alone to declare an act of the European Union invalid, and in particular a directive, the purpose of that jurisdiction being to guarantee legal certainty by ensuring that EU law is applied uniformly")
169. See von Bogdandy, "Prinzipien der Rechtsfortbildung im europäischen Rechtsraum - Überlegungen zum Lissabon-Urteil des BVerfG", 63 NJW (2010), 1
170. Cf. also Pernice, "La Rete Europea di Costituzionalità - Der EuropäischeVerfassungsverbund und die Netzwerktheorie", 70 ZaöRV (2010), 51, 67-70.
171. For commentary on this decision see Payandeh, "Constitutional Review of EU Law after Honeywell: Contextualizing the Relationship between the German Constitutional Court and the EU Court of Justice", 48 CML Rev. (2011), 9.