Lisbon before the courts: Comparative perspectives

European Constitutional Law Review

Volumn 7, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 96-137

  Wendel, Mattias ^a  

^a HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Austrian Constitutional Court; Bundesverfassungsgericht; Conseil Constitutionnel; Constitutional identity; Czech Constitutional Court; Democracy; European Union; Hungarian Constitutional Court; Latvian Constitutional Court; Polish Constitutional Court; Sovereignty; Treaty of Lisbon

Indexed keywords

EID: 79956096468     PISSN: 15740196     EISSN: 17445515     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1574019611100061     Document Type: Review

References (313)

1. I. Pernice, 'The Treaty of Lisbon: Multilevel constitutionalism in Action', 15 CJEL (2009) p. 349 et seq.
2. See on that A.E. Kellermann et al. (eds.), EU-Enlargement - The Constitutional Impact at EU and National Level (T.M.C. Asser Press 2001);
3. id. et al. (eds.), The Impact of EU Accession on the Legal Orders of New Member States and (Pre-)Candidate Countries (T.M.C. Asser Press 2006);
4. A. Albi, EU Enlargement and the Constitutions of Central and Eastern Europe (Cambridge University Press 2005) p. 67-121;
5. id., '"Europe" Articles in the Constitutions of Central and Eastern European Countries', 42 CMLRev (2005) p. 399 et seq.
6. For the concept of constitutional permeability, see M. Wendel, Permeabilität im europäischen Verfassungsrecht (Mohr Siebeck 2011, forthcoming), ch. 1.
7. For a systematic analysis of integration clauses in the constitutions of the EU Member States cf. Wendel, supra n. 3, chs. 4-11.
8. For an overview, see C. Grabenwarter, 'National Constitutional Law Relating to the European Union', in A. v. Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds.), Principles of European Constitutional Law, 2nd edn. (Hart 2009) p. 83 et seq.
9. Federal constitutional law, Austrian federal law gazette I No 57/2010.
10. Bill No. 2009/10:80. The bill includes the introduction of a general clause indicating Sweden's Membership in the EU (future Ch. 1 § 10 of the Swedish 'Form of Government') as well as the reform of the existing integration clause (currently Ch. 10 § 5, in future Ch. 10 § 6). For information about the reform I would like to thank Carl Fredrik Bergstrüm.
11. An example is Spain, where the Spanish State Council (Consejo de Estado) pleaded as early as 2006 for the introduction of a new and explicit 'Europe-clause' in its opinion of 16 Feb. 2006, No. E 1/2005, available at .
12. Spanish CT, Case 1/2004 Constitutional Treaty, declaration of 13 Dec. 2004, with case notes of F. Castillo de la Torre, 42 CMLRev (2005) p. 1169 et seq.
13. C.B. Schutte, 1 EuConst (2005) p. 281 et seq.
14. and A.C. Becker, EuR (2005) p. 353 et seq.
15. Polish CT, Case K 18/04 Accession Treaty, judgment of 11 May 2005. An English summary is available at: .
16. For comments, see M. Bainczyk and U. Ernst, EuR (2006) p. 247 et seq.;
17. A. łazowski, 3 EuConst (2007) p. 148 et seq.;
18. S. Biernat, 'Off ene Staatlichkeit', in A. v. Bogdandy and P.M. Huber (eds.), Ius Publicum Europaeum, Vol. 2 (C.F. Müler 2008) § 21 Polen, para. 45.
19. For a comparative analysis, see A. Albi, 'Ironies in Human Rights Protection in the EU: Pre- Accession Conditionality and Post-Accession Conundrums', 15 ELJ (2009) p. 46, 52 et seq.;
20. id., 'Supremacy of EC Law in the New Member States', 3 EuConst (2007) p. 25, 48 et seq.;
21. W. Sadurski, '"Solange, chapter 3": Constitutional Courts in Central Europe - Democracy - European Union', 14 ELJ (2008) p. 1, 6 et seq.
22. See on that J. Komárek, 'European constitutionalism and the European Arrest Warrant - in Search of the Limits of "Contrapunctual Principles"', 44 CMLRev (2007) p. 9, 16 et seq.;
23. Z. Kühn, 'The European Arrest Warrant, Th ird Pillar Law and National Constitutional Resistance/Acceptance', 3 CYELP (2007) p. 99 et seq.
24. French CC, Case 2004-505 DC Constitutional Treaty, decision of 19 Nov. 2004.
25. Cf. The comments of G. Carcassonne, 1 EuConst (2005) p. 293 et seq.;
26. F. Chaltiel, 484 RMC (2005) p. 5 et seq.;
27. X. Magnon, 62 RFDC (2005) p. 329 et seq.;
28. J. Roux, RDP (2005) p. 59 et seq.
29. French CC, Case 2004-496 DC E-Commerce, decision of 10 June 2004.
30. See the case notes of F.C. Mayer, EuR (2004) p. 925 et seq. (also relating to the decision on the Constitutional Treaty);
31. J. Dutheil de la Rochère, 42 CMLRev (2005) p. 859 et seq.;
32. J.-H. Reestman, 1 EuConst (2005) p. 302 et seq.
33. French CC, Case 2006-540 DC Information Society, decision of 27 July 2006. For comments see F. Chaltiel, RFDC (2006) p. 837 et seq.
34. and C. Charpy, 3 EuConst (2007) p. 436, 445 et seq.
35. French CE, Case 287110 Ass. Arcelor, decision of 8 Feb. 2007, para. 11.
36. Cf. The case notes of P. Cassia, RTDE (2007) p. 406 et seq.;
37. F. Chaltiel, RMC (2007) p. 335 et seq.;
38. X. Magnon, RFDA (2007) p. 578;
39. A. Levade, RFDA (2007) p. 564, 577;
40. C. Charpy, 3 EuConst (2007) p. 436, 440 et seq. and p. 452 et seq.;
41. F.C. Mayer and E. Lenski and M. Wendel, EuR (2008) p. 63 et seq.
42. French CE, Case 298348 Mme P, decision of 30 Oct. 2009, para. 9;
43. cf. C. Charpy, 6 EuConst (2010) p. 123 et seq.
44. and C.D. Classen, EuR (2010) p. 557 et seq.
45. German BVerfG, Case 2 BvR 2661/06 Honeywell, order of 6 July 2010, paras. 58 et seq.
46. The decision was published not until 26 Aug. 2010. An English translation is available at .
47. French CC, Case 2007-560 DC Treaty of Lisbon, decision of 20 Dec. 2007.
48. Austrian CC, Case SV 2/08-3 et al. Treaty of Lisbon I, order of 30 Sept. 2008.
49. Czech CC, Case Pl ÚS 19/08 Treaty of Lisbon I, judgment of 26 Nov. 2008. An English translation is available at .
50. See the case note of P. Bříze, 5 EuConst (2009) p. 143 et seq.
51. Latvian CC, Case 2008-35-01 Treaty of Lisbon, judgment of 7 April 2009.
52. An English translation is available at .
53. German BVerfG, Case 2 BvE 2/08 et al. Treaty of Lisbon, judgment of 30 June 2009, BVerfGE 123, 267 et seq.
54. An English translation by the BVerfG (fi nal version) is available at: .
55. For the multitude of comments compare the 9 pages (sic) of bibliography in the fi rst special issue of EuR (2010) p. 325-333.
56. For mainly critical assessments, see in particular the comments of D. Th ym, 46 CMLRev (2009) p. 1795 et seq.;
57. R. Bieber, 5 EuConst (2009) p. 391 et seq.;
58. C. Schönberger, 10 GLJ (2009) p. 1201 et seq.;
59. D. Halberstam and C. Möllers, 10 GLJ (2009) p. 1241 et seq.;
60. C.D. Classen, 64 JZ (2009) p. 881 et seq.;
61. M. Jestaedt, 48 Der Staat (2009) p. 496 et seq.;
62. U. Everling, EuR (2010) p. 91 et seq.;
63. J. Schwarze, EuR (2010) p. 108 et seq.;
64. C. Tomuschat, 70 ZaöRV (2010) p. 251 et seq.;
65. T. Eijsbouts, 6 EuConst (2010) p. 199 et seq.
66. For more affi rmative appraisals cf. F. Schorkopf, 10 GLJ (2009) p. 1219 et seq.;
67. D. Grimm, 5 EuConst (2009) p. 353 et seq.;
68. K.F. Gärditz and C. Hillgruber, 64 JZ (2009) p. 872 et seq.
69. Czech CC, Case Pl ÚS 29/09 Treaty of Lisbon II, judgment of 3 Nov. 2009. An English translation of the most important sections by J. Komárek is contained in 6 EuConst (2009) p. 345 et seq.
70. For the perspective of a German legal scholar, see I. Ley, 65 JZ (2010) p. 165 et seq.
71. Hungarian CC, Case 143/2010 (VII. 14.) Treaty of Lisbon, judgment of 12 July 2010. An English translation has not been rendered yet, except for a short press review. For translation and important information I would like to thank warmly Adél Holdampf and Attila Vincze.
72. Austrian CC, Case SV 1/10-9 Treaty of Lisbon II, order of 12 June 2010.
73. Polish CT, Case K 32/09 Treaty of Lisbon, judgment of 24 Nov. 2010.
74. See on that J.H. Danielsen, 'One of Many National Constraints on European Integration: Section 20 of the Danish Constitution', 16 EPL (2010) p. 181, 190 et seq.
75. Dutch State Council, Case W02.07.0254/II/E Lisbon-Mandate, opinion of 12 Sept. 2007.
76. An English translation is available at .
77. For a comment, see J. Ziller, 'The Law and Politics of the Ratifi cation of the Lisbon Treaty', in S. Griller and J. Ziller (eds.), The Lisbon Treaty (Springer 2008) p. 309, 319 et seq.
78. Contrary to what it had said in respect to the Constitutional Treaty, the Danish Ministry of Justice qualifi ed the Lisbon Treaty as a treaty which did not transfer competences in the sense of the constitutional integration clause in the Danish constitution (Art. 20) and thus could be ratifi ed like an ordinary treaty of public international law under Article 19 of the Danish constitution.
79. The Treaty of Lisbon: an impact assessment', report of 13 March 2008, available at: < www. publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldselect/ldeucom/ 62/62.pdf>.
80. Apart from the almost uncountable number of comments on the decision of the German BVerfG, there are apparently only three contributions dealing with some of the Lisbon decisions in a comparative perspective, cf. J.-H. Reestman, 'The Franco-German Constitutional Divide', 5 Eu- Const (2009) p. 374 et seq. specifi cally concerning the aspect of constitutional identity;
81. A. Weber, 'Die Europäische Union unter Richtervorbehalt', 65 JZ (2010) p. 157 et seq.
82. with a comment on the German Lisbon decision in a broader comparative perspective, and R.U. Krámer, 'Looking through Diff erent Glasses at the Lisbon Treaty: The German Constitutional Court and the Czech Constitutional Court', in A. Fischer-Lescano et al. (eds.) 'The German Constitutional Court's Lisbon Ruling: Legal and Political Science Perspectives', ZERP-Diskussionspapier 1/2010 (Universitát Bremen 2010) P. 11 et seq. comparing the fi rst decision of the Czech CC with the Lisbon judgment of the German BVerfG.
83. An author has aptly compared the resulting multitude of interpretations with the Japanese fi lm 'Rashomon'. All characters have experienced or suff ered the same incident, but recount it completely diff erent. See F.C. Mayer, 'Rashomon in Karlsruhe - A Refl ection on Democracy and Identity in the European Union', Jean Monnet Working Paper 5/10.
84. German BVerfG Honeywell, supra n. 16 at para. 58 et seq.
85. Ibid. F. C. Mayer,Jean Monnet Working Paper 5/10, para. 102.
86. The term is translated by the BVerfG as 'openness towards European law'. It must be doubted that this is an appropriate translation as the German term then would have been - semantically even more precise - framed 'Europarechtsoff enheit'.
87. German BVerfG Treaty of Lisbon, supra n. 21 at para. 225, 240 et seq., and 340. For possible meanings of the concept, see A. Voßkuhle, 'Der Europäische Verfassungsgerichtsverbund', NVwZ (2010) p. 1, 5;
88. id., 'Multilevel Cooperation of the European Constitutional Courts', 6 EuConst (2010) p. 175 et seq.;
89. F.C. Mayer, 'Europarechtsfreundlichkeit und Europarechtsskepsis in der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts', in T. Giegerich (ed.), Der off ene Verfassungsstaat des Grundgesetzes nach 60 Jahren (Duncker & Humblot 2010) p. 237, 256 et seq.
90. German BVerfG Treaty of Lisbon, supra n. 21 at para. 224, 228 et seq., 247 et seq., 263, 280 et seq., 299 et seq.
91. For the obscurity and polysemy of the term sovereignty in a comparative context, see Wendel, supra n. 4, ch. 3.
92. In that sense D. Th ym, 'In the Name of Sovereign Statehood', 46 CMLRev (2009) p. 1795, 1821.
93. The Austrian CC has also delivered decisions on both occasions, but rejected all remedies as inadmissible, vide infra.
94. See the contribution of J. Dutheil de la Rochère, in I. Pernice and J.M. Beneyto Pérez (eds.), Europés Constitutional Challenges in the Light of the Recent Case Law: Lisbon and Beyond (Nomos 2011 forthcoming).
95. Dutch State Council Lisbon-Mandate, supra n. 27, point 3.4.
96. See on that J. Ziller, 'The Law and Politics of the Ratifi cation of the Lisbon Treaty', in S. Griller and J. Ziller (eds.), The Lisbon Treaty (Springer 2008) p. 309, 322 et seq.
97. French CC Treaty of Lisbon, supra n. 17, in particular paras. 12, 21, 24, 26 et seq. and 29.
98. French CC Constitutional Treaty, supra n. 12 at paras. 13 and 22.
99. Spanish CT Constitutional Treaty, supra n. 8, in particular points II-4 and II-6.
100. The advisory opinions are not published. For an analysis cf. F. Delpérée, 'Le Conseil d'Etat de Belgique et le traité établissant une Constitution pour l'Europe', 21 RFDA (2005) p. 242 et seq.
101. Cf. J. Nergelius, 'Sweden's Possible Ratifi cation of the EU Constitution: A Case-Study of "Wait and See"', in A. Albi and J. Ziller (eds.), The European Constitution and National Constitutions ( Kluwer 2007) p. 183, 187.
102. French CC Constitutional Treaty, supra n. 12 at paras. 27 et seq.
103. and later French CC Treaty of Lisbon, supra n. 17, in particular paras. 18 et seq. With regard to parliamentary rights, the CC demanded in its Lisbon decision - in addition to what it had already decided in its previous decision concerning the Constitutional Treaty - a constitutional revision also with regard to the parliamentary veto right under Art. 81.3 TFEU and the subsidiarity control mechanism under the reframed Art. 7.3 of Protocol No. 2 on the exercise of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.
104. See paras. 30-32 of the Lisbon decision.
105. Constitutional Laws No. 2005-204 of 1 March 2005 (with view to the Constitutional Treaty) and No. 2008-103 of 4 Feb. 2008 (with view to the Lisbon Treaty). In addition, the EU related provisions of the French constitution were amended signifi cantly by the constitutional reformpackage contained in Constitutional Law No. 2008-724 of 23 July 2008 which aimed at the 'modernisation of the institutions'. With Art. 61-1 this law also introduced the constitutional basis for the new a posterior review-powers of the French CC (so-called question prioritaire de constitutionnalité).
106. Art. 88-1. Before the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty Art. 88-1 contained a separate para. 2 according to which France 'can participate' ('peut participer') in the EU under the conditions laid down in the Constitutional Treaty or the Lisbon treaty (see the respective fi rst article of the Constitutional Laws No. 2005-204 and No. 2008-103).
107. Cf. Arts. 88-4, 88-6 and 88-7 of the French Constitution. Similar to Art. 23.1a of the German Basic Law, Art. 88-6.3 frames the subsidiarity action as a parliamentary minority right.
108. With the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the general integration clause in Art. 88-1 was also recast, according to Art. 2 of the constitutional law 2008-103. Art. 88-1 now states that the French Republic 'shall participate in the European Union constituted by States which have freely chosen to exercise some of their powers in common by virtue of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as they result from the treaty signed in Lisbon on 13 Dec. 2007.'
109. For the decisions of the Czech CC, see the contribution of J. Zemánek, in I. Pernice and J.M. Beneyto Pérez (eds.), Europés Constitutional Challenges in the Light of the Recent Case Law: Lisbon and Beyond (Nomos 2011 forthcoming).
110. Constitutional Law No. 395/2001 of 18 Oct. 2001.
111. Czech CC Treaty of Lisbon I, supra n. 19.
112. Albeit including some provisions which were already in force within the framework of the EU- and the EC-treaty, cf. ibid., paras. 75, 77 et seq. and 85-87.
113. See on that P. Bříze, supra n. 19 at p. 145 et seq.
114. Czech CC Treaty of Lisbon II, supra n. 22.
115. Ibid., paras. 115 et seq.
116. Ibid., para. 121.
117. Ibid., para. 116.
118. Ibid., para. 116.
119. Under Art. 36.1 of the Act on the Constitutional Court the Hungarian parliament, the president and the government may request the examination of the constitutionality of provisions of the international treaty before its confi rmation.
120. Act CLXVIII of 2007.
121. According to Art. 1 lit b) of the Act on the Constitutional Court the competence of the Constitutional Court includes i.a. The ex post examination for unconstitutionality of laws.
122. Hungarian CC Treaty of Lisbon, supra n. 23. Two separate opinions (supporting the over-all result but diff ering as to the grounds) and a dissenting opinion were delivered with the judgment. While the fi rst separate and the dissenting opinion tackled the question of admissibility in a 'Eurofriendly' way, the second separate opinion highlighted the constitutional limits to the conferral of competences and the principle of primacy.
123. Ibid., point IV.2.
124. Ibid., point IV.2.2.
125. According to this provision the president, before ratifying an international agreement may refer it to the CT with a request to adjudicate upon its conformity to the Polish constitution.
126. Both Arts. 90.2 (parliamentary procedure in case of a conferral of competences to international organisations) and 235.4 (amendment procedure) require a two-thirds majority vote in the chamber of deputies in the presence of at least half of the statutory number of Deputies. The diff erence is that Art. 90.2 also requires a two-thirds majority vote in the Senate in the presence of at least half of the statutory number of Senators, while Art. 235.4 only requires an absolute majority of votes in the presence of at least half of the statutory number of senators.
127. Th is provision establishes the competence of the Polish CT to decide on the conformity of statutes and international agreements with the Polish Constitution.
128. The representative of the group of deputies, deputy Antoni Macierewicz, stormed out of the auditorium after the CT had rejected his motion to postpone the judgment until the bill regulating the cooperation of the government and the parliament in EU aff airs came into force. The CT rejected the motion because the initial proceeding covered only the constitutionality of the Lisbon Treaty, but not of the (future) accompanying legislation.
129. The intra-institutional proceedings initiated by the parliamentary group of the Left Party against the chamber of deputies (Bundestag) were declared inadmissible to a large extent.
130. Cases 2 BvR 839/05 and 2 BvE 2/05.
131. Th is argument was given in a letter by the then judge rapporteur Broß addressed to the parties.
132. German BVerfG, Case 2 BvR 2134 et al. Treaty of Maastricht, judgment of 12 Oct. 1993, BVerfGE p. 89, 155, 171 et seq.
133. German FCC Treaty of Lisbon, supra n. 21 at para. 208.
134. Ibid., para. 168.
135. The 'principle of the social state' is part of the basic principles under Art. 20.1 and therefore protected in its material core by Art. 79.3.
136. See already C. Tomuschat, 'Die Europäische Union unter der Aufsicht des Bundesverfassungsgerichts', EuGRZ (1993) p. 489;
137. K.M. Meessen, 'Maastricht nach Karlsruhe', NJW (1994) p. 549, 550 et seq.
138. In the context of the Lisbon judgment, see now R. Bieber, 'An Association of Sovereign States', 5 EuConst (2009) p. 391, 396.
139. The se privileged applicants are: the Federal Government, a Land government, or one fourth (until 30 Nov. 2009 a third) of the members of the Bundestag.
140. Thym, supra n. 38 at p. 1796 et seq.
141. German BVerfG Treaty of Lisbon, supra n. 21 at paras. 172 et seq., in particular 182.
142. Ibid., paras. 168, 181.
143. The BVerfG took the view that the complainants had not convincingly established a 'necessary connection' with the principle of democracy in this regard, ibid., para. 183.
144. Critically concerning the pre-constitutional construction also M. Jestaedt, 'Warum in die Ferne schweifen, wenn der Maßstab liegt so nah?', 48 Der Staat (2009) p. 496, 501 and 512 et seq.
145. For a critique of the BVerfG's concept of 'people', see T. Eijsbouts, 'Wir sind das Volk: Notes about the Notion of "The People" as Occasioned by the Lissabon-Urteil', 6 EuConst (2010) p. 199 et seq.
146. German BVerfG Treaty of Lisbon, supra n. 21 at para. 179 et seq. and 228.
147. Can this really be a 'right' in legal categories?
148. Art. 146 states: Th is Basic Law, which since the achievement of the unity and freedom of Germany applies to the entire German people, shall cease to apply on the day on which a constitution freely adopted by the German people takes eff ect.
149. See German BVerfG Treaty of Lisbon, supra n. 21 at para. 180.
150. See also the critique of D. Halberstam and C. Möllers, 'The German Constitutional Court says "Ja zu Deutschland!"', 10 GLJ (2009) p. 1241, 1256.
151. The RIA is contained in Art. 1 of the new Act Extending and Strengthening the Rights of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat in European Union Matters of 22 Sept. 2009, I no. 60 Offi cial Federal Law Gazette (2009) p. 3022 et seq.
152. The very same day, two other laws were passed, concerning the cooperation between Federal Government and Bundestag in EU matters (I no. 60 Offi cial Federal Law Gazette (2009) 3026 et seq.)
153. as well as the cooperation between the Federal state and the Länder in EU matters (I no. 60 Offi cial Federal Law Gazette (2009) p. 3031 et seq.).
154. For a comment, see M. Nettesheim, 'Die Integrationsverantwortung - Vorgaben des BVerfG und gesetzgeberische Umsetzung', 63 NJW (2010) p. 177 et seq.
155. German BVerfG, Case 2 BvR 2136/09 Accompanying Laws to the Lisbon Treaty, order of 22 Sept. 2009.
156. For an overview over the 'constitutional' jurisdictions in the EU member states, see F.C. Mayer, 'Multilevel Constitutional Jurisdiction', in A. v. Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds.), Principles of European Constitutional Law, 2nd edn. (Hart 2009) p. 399, 400 et seq.
157. Under Art. 44.3 of the Austrian Federal Constitutional Law any 'total revision of the Federal Constitution shall ... be submitted to a referendum by the entire nation, whereas any partial revision requires this only if one third of the members of the National Council or the Federal Council so demands.'
158. Austrian CC Treaty of Lisbon I, supra n. 18, point II.2.
159. German BVerfG Treaty of Lisbon, supra n. 21 at para. 170 in line with established case-law.
160. The necessary threshold consists of one third of the National Council's (chamber of deputies) members, Art. 140.1 sentence 2 of the Austrian Federal Constitutional Law.
161. Austrian CC Treaty of Lisbon II, supra n. 24, point II.3.
162. Cf. Arts. 16 no. 1, 17.2 no. 11 and 192 (sic) of the Latvian Act on the Constitutional Court.
163. Latvian CC Treaty of Lisbon, supra n. 20.
164. Ibid., points 9 and 13.
165. Art. 2 reads as follows: 'The sovereign power of the State of Latvia is vested in the people of Latvia.'
166. Latvian CC Treaty of Lisbon, supra n. 20, points 9 et seq.
167. Ibid., point 19.4.
168. Ibid., points 16.1-18.10. Th us the Latvian CC also rejected a violation of Art. 101.
169. For judicial 'acts of self-authorisation', see - in a historical-comparative perspective - D. Herr mann, 'Akte der Selbstautorisierung als Grundstock institutioneller Macht von Verfassungsgerichten', in H. VorLänder (ed.), Die Deutungsmacht der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit (VS-Verlag 2006) p. 141, 157 et seq..
170. Cf. German BVerfG Treaty of Lisbon, supra n. 21 at para. 239.
171. Cases in which Art. 48.7 could be applied are, for instance, Arts. 82.2 (2) (d), 83.1 (3), 86.4 and 308.3 TFEU.
172. Supra n. 105.
173. See German BVerfG Treaty of Lisbon, supra n. 21 at paras. 412-419.
174. For the diff erences, see in detail I. Pernice, 'Motor or Brake for European Policies? Germany's New Role in the EU after the Lisbon Judgment of Its Federal Constitutional Court', in I. Pernice and J.M. Beneyto Pérez (eds.), Europe's Constitutional Challenges in the Light of the Recent Case Law: Lisbon and Beyond (Nomos 2011 forthcoming), point IV.
175. French CC Constitutional Treaty, supra n. 12 at para. 36
176. and later French CC Treaty of Lisbon, supra n. 17, para. 26. According to the CC Art. 53 of the French Constitution applies in this respect.
177. German BVerfG Treaty of Lisbon, supra n. 21 at para. 312
178. with reference to French CC Treaty of Lisbon, supra n. 17 at para. 26.
179. French CC Constitutional Treaty, supra n. 12 at paras. 33-35
180. and French ConC Treaty of Lisbon, supra n. 17, paras. 23 et seq. and 27.
181. See explicitly German BVerfG Treaty of Lisbon, supra n. 21 at para. 236 at the end.
182. In contrast, particularly Art. 352 TFEU does not seem to be a constitutional problem for the French CC at all.
183. See Czech CC Treaty of Lisbon I, supra n. 19 at paras. 161-164, 172-175;
184. Czech CC Treaty of Lisbon II, supra n. 22 at para. 134;
185. Latvian CC Treaty of Lisbon, supra n. 20, point 18.6;
186. Hungarian CC Treaty of Lisbon, supra n. 23, point IV.2.5 and Polish CT Treaty of Lisbon, supra n. 25.
187. Latvian CC Treaty of Lisbon, supra n. 20, point 18.6 (emphasis added).
188. Czech CC Treaty of Lisbon I, supra n. 19 at para. 151 et seq.
189. Ibid., para. 173: 'The Treaty of Lisbon transfers powers to bodies that have their own regularly reviewed legitimacy, arising from general elections in the individual member states. Moreover, the Treaty of Lisbon permits several ways of involving domestic parliaments (the possibility for a parliament, or one of its chambers, to directly express its lack of consent, is one of the forms of participation by domestic parliaments)' (emphasis added).
190. Czech CC Treaty of Lisbon II, supra n. 22 at para. 138 with reference to the opinion of former A.G. Poiares Maduro of 26 March 2009, Case C-411/06, Commission v. Parliament and Council.
191. Ibid., para. 137 et seq. (emphasis added).
192. Ibid., para. 147 and Czech CC Treaty of Lisbon I, supra n. 19 at para. 104.
193. German BVerfG Treaty of Lisbon, supra n. 21 at paras. 236, 280 and 293 (emphasis added).
194. Ibid., para. 248: 'The safeguarding of sovereignty, demanded by the principle of democracy in the valid constitutional system ...' (emphasis added).
195. Ibid., para. 211.
196. The BVerfG demands that democratic requirements in this new entity would have 'to be fully consistent with the requirements for the democratic legitimation of a union of rule organised by a state', cf. ibid., para. 263. However, it is not clear what the normative basis for this claim shall be, as it can't be the (then superseded) Basic Law.
197. Ibid., paras. 179, 229, 263, 298 and 334.
198. See also D. Halberstam and C. Möllers, supra n. 88 at p. 1255 et seq.
199. Cf. supra n. 21.
200. British European Union (Amendment) Act of 19 June 2008, available at .
201. German BVerfG Treaty of Lisbon, supra n. 21, at para. 320.
202. Act No. 162/2009.
203. Czech CC Treaty of Lisbon I, supra n. 19 at para. 165, confi rmed in Czech CC Treaty of Lisbon II, supra n. 22 at para. 134.
204. Th is is a line of argument which also characterised the European Arrest warrant case. It is probably one of the great ironies that it is a constitutional court which obliges the national parliament to observe its responsibility for integration.
205. See also the High Court for England and Wales (Queen's Bench Division, Divisional Court), R (on the application of Stuart Wheeler) v. Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary [2008] EWHC 1409 (Admin), which 'found nothing in the claimant's case to cast doubt on the lawfulness of ratifying the Lisbon Treaty without a referendum' (para. 59).
206. Latvian CC Treaty of Lisbon, supra n. 20, points 18 and 19.
207. Austrian CC Treaty of Lisbon II, supra n. 24, point II.3.1.
208. The fi rst referendum was held on 12 June 2008 and resulted in a negative outcome. The second referendum was held on 2 October 2009 and resulted in a positive outcome. See on that M. Cahill, 'Ireland's Constitutional Amendability and Europe's Constitutional Ambition: the Lisbon Referendum in Context', 9 GLJ (2008) p. 1191 et seq.
209. Irish Supreme Court, Case 1986 No. 12036P, Crotty v. An Taoiseach [1987] IR 713.
210. Now Art. 29.4 No. 5 of the Irish constitution.
211. As to the Constitutional Treaty, see G Hogan, 'Ratifi cation of the European Constitution - Implications for Ireland', in A. Albi and J. Ziller (eds.), The European Constitution and National Constitutions (Kluwer 2007) p. 137 et seq.
212. Art. 46.2 of the Irish constitution.
213. Whether an express constitutional authorisation is really necessary under the Crotty-doctrine is contentious, see, e.g., A. Maurer and B. Roth, 'Warum Irland abstimmen muss(te) - oder auch nicht', available at .
214. The referendum concerning the Constitutional Treaty was appointed by presidential Decree No. 2005-218 of 9 March 2005.
215. See L.F.M. Besselink, 'Constitutional Referenda in the Netherlands: A Debate in the Margin', 11 EJCL (May 2007) p. 1, 14
216. and id, 'The Dutch Constitution, the European Constitution and the Referendum in the Netherlands', in A. Albi and J. Ziller (eds.), The European Constitution and National Constitutions (Kluwer 2007) p. 113, 118.
217. Dutch State Council Lisbon-Mandate, supra n. 27, point 4.2: 'The re is nothing in the Constitution to prevent the legislator from holding such referendums on an ad hoc basis, provided that it indicates that there is a special justifi cation for departing from the self-contained arrangements for approving treaties and provided that the referendum procedure is governed by an Act of Parliament. Mere precedent will not suffi ce. Th at would create a substantive basis for the referendum as a structural instrument (in this case, for use when approving treaties) which would not be in keeping with the self-contained arrangements in the Constitution.'
218. See on that J. Ziller, 'The Law and Politics of the Ratifi cation of the Lisbon Treaty', in S. Griller and J. Ziller (eds.), The Lisbon Treaty (Springer 2008) p. 309, 317 et seq.
219. See H. Koch, 'The Danish Constitutional Order', in A.E. Kellermann et al. (ed.), EU-Enlargement - The Constitutional Impact at EU and National Level (TMC Asser Press 2001) p. 109, 111.
220. Critically to this practise H. Rasmussen, 'Denmark's Waning Constitutionalism and Article 20 of the Constitution on Transfer of Sovereignty', in A. Albi and J. Ziller (eds.), The European Constitution and National Constitutions (Kluwer 2007) p. 149, 150.
221. Opinion of 4 Dec. 2007. In the aftermath of this opinion, on 11 Dec. 2007 the Danish government took the decision to ratify the Lisbon Treaty according to the ordinary procedure under Art. 19 of the Danish constitution. The approval of the Danish parliament followed on 24 April 2008.
222. See particularly Arts. 3a.2 of the Slovenian, 68.4 of the Latvian, 90.3 of the Polish and 10a.2 of the Czech constitution, allowing the national parliament to take a decision to substitute or complement its own act of approval by a referendum. In France, according to Art. 88-5 of the constitution any bill authorizing the ratifi cation of a treaty pertaining to the accession of a state to the EU shall be submitted to referendum by the President of the Republic. But also here, by passing a motion adopted in identical terms in each house by a three-fi fths majority, parliament may authorize the passing of a bill according to the (parliamentary) constitutional amendment procedure.
223. See in particular French CC, Case No. 92-308 DC Maastricht I, decision of 9 April 1992.
224. Cf. French CC Constitutional Treaty, supra n. 12 at para. 7 and Treaty of Lisbon, supra n. 17, para. 9.
225. According to Art. 89.5 of the French constitution, the 'republican form of government shall not be the object of any amendment'.
226. French CC, Case 2003-469 Decentralisation, decision of 26 March 2003, paras. 2 and 3. Th at the Conseil constitutionnel shows extreme reluctance with regard to Art. 89.5 of the French constitution is also illustrated by its Maastricht decisions. After the Conseil had ruled in a fi rst decision that the ratifi cation of the Maastricht Treaty required a prior constitutional amendment in 1992 (Case 92-308 DC Maastricht I, decision of 9 April 1992) it was asked to review the constitutionality of the Maastricht Treaty a second time. The group of senators who introduced the second proceeding was unsatisfi ed that the French constituent authority had not amended pre-existing provisions, such as the sovereignty-clause under Art. 3, but had decided merely to supplement the French constitution with several EU related provisions. In other words, the second proceeding would have given the Conseil the opportunity to make its views on the constitutionality of the constitutional amendment. However, the Conseil did not follow the argument of the applicants, according to which the ratifi cation of the Maastricht Treaty was still unconstitutional. Instead it decided that 'subject to the provisions governing the periods in which the Constitution cannot be revised (Arts. 7 and 16 and the fourth paragraph of Art. 89) and to compliance with the fi fth paragraph of Art. 89 ('The republican form of government shall not be the object of an amendment'), the constituent authority is sovereign; it has the power to repeal, amend or amplify constitutional provisions in such manner as it sees fi t; there is accordingly no objection to insertion in the Constitution of new provisions which derogate from a constitutional rule or principle; the derogation may be express or implied' (French CC, Case 92-312 DC Maastricht II, decision of 2 Sept. 1992, para. 19, emphasis added).
227. See on that J. Ziller, 'Sovereignty in France: Getting Rid of the Mal de Bodin', in N. Walker (ed.), Sovereignty in Transition (Hart 2003) p. 261, 271 et seq.
228. In its third Maastricht decision the CC declared itself not competent to decide on the constitutionality of the law approving the ratifi cation as this law had been subjected to a referendum and was thus a direct expression of national sovereignty ('expression directe de la souveraineté nationale'), French CC, Case 92-313 DC Maastricht III, decision of 23 Sept. 1992, para. 2.
229. L. Favoreu, La politique saisie par le droit (Economica 1988) p. 30.
230. Hungarian CC Treaty of Lisbon, supra n. 23, point IV.2.3.2.
231. According to the Polish CT Treaty of Lisbon, supra n. 25, this limit is
232. According to Art. 79.3 of the German Basic Law amendments 'aff ecting the division of the Federation into Länder, their participation on principle in the legislative process, or the principles laid down in Articles 1 [human dignity - human rights - legally binding force of basic rights] and 20 [constitutional core principles] shall be inadmissible.'
233. The little, albeit characteristic part 'seit jeher', which suggests historic continuity instead of providing substantial arguments, was left out in the offi cial English translation.
234. German BVerfG Treaty of Lisbon, supra n. 21 at para. 252.
235. Ibid., paras. 253-260.
236. Vf. C. Schönberger, 'Lisbon in Karlsruhe: Maastricht's Epigones at Sea', 10 GLJ (2009) p. 1201, 1208 et seq. who speaks even of an 'arrogation of power'.
237. German BVerfG Treaty of Lisbon, supra n. 21 at para. 259.
238. Vf. J. Bodin, Les six livres de la République, 10th edn. (1593 - reprint 1986), book I, chs. XX 295, 306 and 309.
239. Similarly C. Schönberger, supra n. 155 at p. 1209.
240. Cf. Weber, supra n. 30, who draws a comparable conclusion.
241. See, above all, French CC Decentralisation, supra n. 150.
242. M. Cartabia, 'The Legacy of Sovereignty in Italian Constitutional Debate', in N. Walker (ed.), Sovereignty in Transition (Hart 2003) p. 305, 316.
243. See J. Iliopoulos-Strangas, 'Off ene Staatlichkeit', in A. v. Bogdandy and P.M. Huber (eds.) Ius Publicum Europaeum, vol. II (C.F. Müler 2008) § 16 Griechenland, para. 43 et seq.
244. M. Poiares Maduro, 'EU Law and National Constitutions: Portugal', manuscript for BIICL (ed.) FIDE XX Congress London, vol. 1 (BIICL 2002), formerly available at , p. 13 et seq.
245. V. Duculescu and A. Ruxandra, 'Romania', in A.E. Kellermann et al. (eds.), The Impact of EU Accession on the Legal Orders of New Member States and (Pre-)Candidate Countries (T.M.C. Asser Press 2006) p. 113, 118 et seq.
246. For the legal situation in Cyprus, see N. Emiliou, 'Cyprus', in A.E. Kellermann et al. (eds.), The Impact of EU Accession on the Legal Orders of New Member States and (Pre-)Candidate Countries (T.M.C. Asser Press 2006) p. 303, 304 et seq.
247. For the historic background of the German eternity clause, see M. Herdegen, 'Article 79', in T. Maunz and G. Dürig (eds.), Grundgesetz - Kommentar, 59th edn. (loose-leaf ) (Beck 2010) paras. 63 et seq.
248. According to Art. 9.2 of the Czech constitution, the 'substantive requisites of the democratic, law-abiding State may not be amended.' According to Art. 1.1, the 'Czech Republic is a sovereign, unitary and democratic, law-abiding State, based on respect for the rights and freedoms of man and citizen.'
249. Czech CC Treaty of Lisbon II, supra n. 22 at paras. 110-113 (emphasis added).
250. See in particular J. Komárek, supra n. 11 at p. 38 et seq. within the context of the European Arrest Warrant cases.
251. Th is does not mean, however, that the Czech CC would pass the buck to the legislator in all cases. But it holds that the 'interference by the Constitutional Court should come into consideration as ultima ratio' only, see Czech CC Treaty of Lisbon I, supra n. 19 at para. 109.
252. See again German BVerfG Treaty of Lisbon, supra n. 21, para. 179.
253. 'Ultra vires act' is here understood in the narrower sense of the word, in contrast to the wider concept which covers also infringements of other principles of EU law than only the principle of conferral, such as the fundamental rights for example. For the diff erent notions, see F.C. Mayer, Kompetenzüberschreitung und Letztentscheidung (C.H. Beck 2000) 24 et seq.
254. German BVerfG Maastricht, supra n. 74 at p. 187 et seq.
255. The claim to exercise an ultra vires review could already be identifi ed previously in Case 2 BvR 255/69 Lütticke, order of 9 June 1971, BVerfGE 31, 145, 174 and Case 2 BvR 687/85 Kloppenburg, order of 8 April 1987, BVerfGE 75, 223, 235.
256. Th is cannot be dealt with in detail here.
257. Ibid., para. 241.
258. At the moment there is no political majority which would opt in favour of such a solution, which might even, for good reasons, give impetus to an infringement procedure under Art. 258 TFEU (ex-Art. 226 TEC).
259. German BVerfG Treaty of Lisbon, supra n. 21 at para. 240.
260. ECJ, Case C-144/04 Mangold, judgment of 22 Nov. 2005.
261. German BVerfG Honeywell, supra n. 16 at para. 60.
262. Ibid., Para 61.
263. German BVerfG Honeywell, supra n. 16 at para. 66.
264. The question was whether the ECJ could derive a 'general principle of the prohibition of discrimination based on age' from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and from their international agreements.
265. One could have interpreted as early as the Kloppenburg decision - supra n. 176 - in that way.
266. For the concept cf. S. Choudhry, 'Migration as a new metaphor in comparative constitutional law', in id. (ed.), The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (CUP 2006) p. 1 et seq.
267. Danish HC, Case I 361/1997 Carlsen v. Rasmussen, judgment of 6 April 1998.
268. Polish CT Accession Treaty, supra n. 9 at points 10.3 and 4.5.
269. Czech CC Treaty of Lisbon I, supra n. 19 at paras. 120, 139 and 216;
270. Treaty of Lisbon II, supra n. 22 at para. 150 referring to the fi rst decision.
271. Th is expression is used by the Czech CC in its fi rst Lisbon decision, supra n. 19 at para. 111.
272. The Czech CC regularly refers to other constitutional courts. One of the most striking examples in this respect is its second sugar quota case of 2006 in which it quotes the assembled prominence of European landmark decisions relating to the principle of primacy, see Czech CC, Case Pl S 50/04 sugar quotas II, decision of 8 March 2006, point VI.A.
273. Cf. supra n. 188 and n. 190.
274. In that sense also S. Biernat, supra n. 9 at para. 46.
275. The Czech CC distances itself expressly from the Polish CT: 'The Polish Constitutional Tribunal, for example, expressly rules out the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to evaluate the limits of conferral of competences on the EU, as, according to the Tribunal, that is a question of interpretation of domestic constitutional law. Although, in terms of the dogmatics of domestic constitutional law, we can agree with that conclusion to a certain extent, it is questionable whether it is necessary to formulate it as sharply as the Tribunal did' (Czech CC Treaty of Lisbon, supra n. 19 at para. 139).
276. See J.-H. Reestman, supra n. 30 at p. 374 et seq.
277. and A. v. Bogdandy, 'Europäische und natio nale Identité: Integration durch Verfassungsrecht?', 62 VVDStRL (2003) p. 156 and 164.
278. For the concept of universal terms in a judicial context, see M. Poiares Maduro, 'Contrapunctual Law'm in N. Walker (ed.), Sovereignty in Transition (Hart 2003) p. 501, 527 et seq.
279. See also F.C. Mayer, supra n. 31, 36.
280. For the use of the term 'identity' within the context of constitutional core principles, see already German BVerfG, Case BvL 52/71 Solange I, order of 29 May 1974, BVerfGE 37, 271, 279 et seq.
281. and Case 2 BvR 197/83 Solange II, order of 22 Oct. 1986, BVerfGE 73, 339, 375 f with reference to the jurisprudence of the Italian CC (in particular Italian CC, Case 183/73 Frontini, decision of 18 Dec. 1973) which does not use the term, but follows a comparable approach in substance.
282. Spanish CT Constitutional Treaty, supra n. 8, point II-3.
283. In this sense, see the case note of F. Castillo de la Torre, 42 CMLR (2005) p. 1169, 1195 et seq.
284. and A.C. Becker, 'Vorrang versus Vorherrschaft', EuR (2005) p. 353, 355.
285. Cf. F. Castillo de la Torre, 42 CMLR (2005) p. 1169, 1193 and 1201.
286. French CC Constitutional Treaty, supra n. 12 at para. 13.
287. French CC E-Commerce, supra n. 13 at para 7.
288. See also Case No. 2004-498 DC Bioethics, decision of 29 July 2004, para 4.
289. This reasoning has been aptly described as a legal osmosis, cf. F. Chaltiel, 'Constitution franíse, constitution europénne, vers l'osmose des ordres juridiques?', 488 RMC (2005) p. 280 et seq.
290. French CC Information Society, supra n. 13 at para. 19.
291. Cf. in that sense the conclusions of the former rapporteur public at the French Conseil d'Etat M Guyomar in case Arcelor, RTDE (2007) p. 378, 385.
292. Th is cannot be dealt with in detail here. For details, see the brilliant analysis of J.-H. Reestman, supra n. 29 at p. 384 et seq., particularly p. 388-390.
293. German BVerfG Treaty of Lisbon, supra n. 21 at para. 240 (emphasis added).
294. Ibid.
295. German BVerfG Honeywell, supra n. 16 at para. 59: 'According to the legal system of the Federal Republic of Germany, the primacy of application of Union law is to be recognised and it is to be guaranteed that the control powers which are constitutionally reserved for the Federal Constitutional Court are only exercised in a manner that is reserved and open towards European law.'
296. German BVerfG, Case 2 BvL 1/97 Banana-Market, order of 7 June 2000, BVerfGE 102, 147 et seq.
297. In Case 1 BvR 256/08 et al. Data retention, judgment of 2 March 2010, para. 218 the German BVerfG stated: 'It is part of the constitutional identity of the Federal Republic of Germany that the citizens' enjoyment of freedom may not be totally recorded and registered, and the Federal Republic must endeavour to preserve this in European and international connections.'
298. The BVerfG here referred explicitly to the identity control under para. 240 of the Lisbon judgment. In its Lisbon judgment the BVerfG also identifi ed the principle of nulla poena sine culpa as being an integral part of the German constitutional identity, German BVerfG Treaty of Lisbon, supra n. 21 at para. 364.
299. See Mayer, supra n. 31, 39 et seq. concluding that in some way any problem of protection of fundamental rights could thus be treated as a problem of constitutional identity too.
300. In this sense Th ym, supra n. 38 at p. 1807.
301. In legal terms, permeability can be defi ned as the capacity of a given legal order to limit its own claim of normative exclusivity in order to enable legal rules or principles which emanate from a formally separated legal order to integrate. See in detail Wendel, supra n. 3, chs. 1 and 13.
302. See also A.G. M. Poiares Maduro, Case C-213/07 Michaniki, opinion of 28 Oct. 2008, para. 32 et seq.
303. The ECJ was, under the former Art. 46 of the TEU-Nice, not competent to interpret the identity-clause under the former Art. 6.3 TEU-Nice.
304. CONV 375/1/02 REV 1, p. 11: 'In the latter respect it was noted that the provision was not a derogation clause. The Member States will remain under a duty to respect the provisions of the Treaties. ... Were the Court of Justice to be given power with respect to such article in a future "basic treaty of constitutional signifi cance", the Court could be the ultimate interpreter of the provision if the political institutions went beyond a reasonable margin of appreciation.'
305. See also F. Castillo de la Torre, 42 CMLR (2005) p. 1169, 1201.
306. Cf. supra n. 215.
307. See particularly the opinion of A.G. M. Poiares Maduro in the case Michaniki, supra n. 213 at para. 32.
308. For more examples, see Wendel, supra n. 3, ch. 13 point II-2-a.
309. An example how the protection of constitutional identity might work in practice is the Omega-case, ECJ case C-36/02 Omega, judgment of 14 Oct. 2004. However, the term 'identity' is not used within this decision.
310. Cf. for example the Conference of European Constitutional Courts, < www.lrkt.lt/confer ence5.html>.
311. Cf. supra n. 198.
312. The German BVerfG issued an English translation for the fi rst time in the European Arrest Warrant case. In the Lisbon- and Honeywell decisions a translation was already available the day the decision was published.
313. See A. Voßkuhle, supra n. 35.