Evolutionary game dynamics in populations with different learners

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 301, Issue , 2012, Pages 161-173

  Chatterjee, Krishnendu ^a   Zufferey, Damien ^a   Nowak, Martin A ^b  

^a INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AUSTRIA   (Austria)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Direct reciprocity (Prisoner's dilemma); Evolutionary game theory; Learning theory

Indexed keywords

EVOLUTIONARY THEORY; GAME THEORY; LEARNING; POPULATION DYNAMICS; POPULATION THEORY; PRISONER DILEMMA;

ARTICLE; CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK; COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS; CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY; EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY; LEARNING; MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS; POPULATION DYNAMICS; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PROBABILITY;

BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; GAME THEORY; HUMANS; LEARNING; MODELS, GENETIC; MODELS, PSYCHOLOGICAL; MUTATION;

EID: 84858721964     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: 10958541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.02.021     Document Type: Article

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