The appropriateness of emotions: Moral judgment, moral emotions, and the conflation problem

Ethical Perspectives

Volumn 18, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 107-140

  Sauer, Hanno ^a  

^a LEIDEN UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Conflation problem; Daniel Jacobson; Justin D'Arms; Meta ethics; Moral emotions; Moral judgment; Neo sentimentalism

Indexed keywords

EID: 84858709175     PISSN: 13700049     EISSN: 17831431     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2143/EP.18.1.2066215     Document Type: Review

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