Evolutionarily stable co-operative commitments

Theory and Decision

Volumn 49, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 197-222

  Güth, Werner ^a   Kliemt, Hartmut ^b  

^a HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^b NONE

Author keywords

Incomplete contracts; Indirect evolution; Intrinsic motivation; Signaling; Trust

Indexed keywords

EID: 12944261759     PISSN: 00405833     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1026570914311     Document Type: Article

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