Judicial detection skill and contractual compliance

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 17, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 509-520

  Kirstein, Roland ^a   Schmidtchen, Dieter ^a  

^a SAARLAND UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031539415     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0144-8188(97)00040-9     Document Type: Article

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