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Volumn 25, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 251-261

Risk Neutrality and Strategic Insurance

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0346561013     PISSN: 10185895     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0440.00063     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (23)

References (18)
  • 1
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    • (1971) Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing
    • Arrow, K.J.1
  • 3
    • 0001590575 scopus 로고
    • Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information
    • BEBCHUK, L.A., 1984, "Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information", RAND Journal of Economics, 15 (3), pp. 404-415.
    • (1984) RAND Journal of Economics , vol.15 , Issue.3 , pp. 404-415
    • Bebchuk, L.A.1
  • 4
    • 0001646111 scopus 로고
    • Suing solely to Extract a Settlement Offer
    • BEBCHUK, L.A., 1988, "Suing solely to Extract a Settlement Offer", The Journal of Legal Studies, 17, pp. 437-450.
    • (1988) The Journal of Legal Studies , vol.17 , pp. 437-450
    • Bebchuk, L.A.1
  • 5
    • 0345880360 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue
    • BEBCHUK, L.A., 1996, "A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue", The Journal of Legal Studies, 25 (1), pp. 1-25.
    • (1996) The Journal of Legal Studies , vol.25 , Issue.1 , pp. 1-25
    • Bebchuk, L.A.1
  • 6
    • 0346527100 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • National Bureau of Economic Research, working paper no. 6474, Cambridge, MA
    • BEBCHUK, L.A., 1998, "Negative Expected Value Suits", National Bureau of Economic Research, working paper no. 6474, Cambridge, MA.
    • (1998) Negative Expected Value Suits
    • Bebchuk, L.A.1
  • 7
    • 0009943155 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • How Would You Like to Pay for That? The Strategic Effect of Fee Arrangements on Settlement Terms
    • BEBCHUK, L.A. and GUZMAN, A., 1996, "How Would You Like to Pay for That? The Strategic Effect of Fee Arrangements on Settlement Terms", Harvard Negotiation Law Review, 1 (1), pp. 53-63.
    • (1996) Harvard Negotiation Law Review , vol.1 , Issue.1 , pp. 53-63
    • Bebchuk, L.A.1    Guzman, A.2
  • 8
    • 0345238045 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Scaling the Stonewall: Retaining Lawyers to Bolster Credibility
    • CROSON, D.C. and MNOOKIN, R.H., 1996, "Scaling the Stonewall: Retaining Lawyers to Bolster Credibility", Harvard Negotiation Law Review, 1 (1), pp. 65-83.
    • (1996) Harvard Negotiation Law Review , vol.1 , Issue.1 , pp. 65-83
    • Croson, D.C.1    Mnookin, R.H.2
  • 9
    • 0006811563 scopus 로고
    • Aversion to Risk Aversion in the New Institutional Economics
    • GOLDBERG, V., 1990, "Aversion to Risk Aversion in the New Institutional Economics", Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 146, pp. 216-222.
    • (1990) Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , vol.146 , pp. 216-222
    • Goldberg, V.1
  • 10
    • 0347787511 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Rechtsschutzversicherungen, Glaubwürdigkeit und die Entscheidung zu klagen
    • Schmidtchen, D. and Weth, S. (eds), Nomos, Baden-Baden
    • KIRSTEIN, R., 1999, "Rechtsschutzversicherungen, Glaubwürdigkeit und die Entscheidung zu klagen", in Schmidtchen, D. and Weth, S. (eds), Der Effizienz auf der Spur. Nomos, Baden-Baden, pp. 96-110.
    • (1999) Der Effizienz auf der Spur , pp. 96-110
    • Kirstein, R.1
  • 12
    • 0001095412 scopus 로고
    • On the Corporate Demand for Insurance
    • MAYERS, D. and SMITH, C.W., 1982, "On the Corporate Demand for Insurance", Journal of Business, 55, pp. 281-295.
    • (1982) Journal of Business , vol.55 , pp. 281-295
    • Mayers, D.1    Smith, C.W.2
  • 13
    • 84975838377 scopus 로고
    • Credible Pretrial Negotiation
    • NALEBUFF, B., 1988, "Credible Pretrial Negotiation", RAND Journal of Economics, 18 (2), pp. 198-210.
    • (1988) RAND Journal of Economics , vol.18 , Issue.2 , pp. 198-210
    • Nalebuff, B.1
  • 14
    • 0002254318 scopus 로고
    • The Selection of Disputes for Litigation
    • PRIEST, G.L. and KLEIN, B., 1984, "The Selection of Disputes for Litigation", The Journal of Legal Studies, 13, pp. 1-55.
    • (1984) The Journal of Legal Studies , vol.13 , pp. 1-55
    • Priest, G.L.1    Klein, B.2
  • 16
    • 84960565386 scopus 로고
    • Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information
    • ROTHSCHILD, M. and STIGLITZ, J., 1976, "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90, pp. 629-649.
    • (1976) The Quarterly Journal of Economics , vol.90 , pp. 629-649
    • Rothschild, M.1    Stiglitz, J.2
  • 17
    • 0347787549 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Mandatory Insurance
    • Bouckart, B. and de Geest, G. (eds), Cheltenham: E. Elgar, entry No. 2400
    • SKOGH, G., 1998, "Mandatory Insurance", in Bouckart, B. and de Geest, G. (eds), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Cheltenham: E. Elgar, entry No. 2400 (http://allserv.rug.ac.be/gdegeest/2400art.htm).
    • (1998) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics
    • Skogh, G.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.