Belief elicitation in the presence of naïve respondents: An experimental study

Journal of Risk and Uncertainty

Volumn 44, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 161-180

  Hao, Li ^a   Houser, Daniel ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS   (United States)

^b GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Belief elicitation; Clock mechanism; Declarative mechanism; Laboratory experiment; Proper scoring rules

Indexed keywords

EID: 84858440943     PISSN: 08955646     EISSN: 15730476     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11166-011-9133-1     Document Type: Article

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