Home-grown values and incentive compatible auction design

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 27, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 427-441

  Rutström, E Elisabet ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA   (United States)

Author keywords

Auctions; English auctions; Experiments; Value elicitation; Vickrey auctions

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032221802     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001820050082     Document Type: Article

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