Implementing efficient multi-object auction institutions: An experimental study of the performance of boundedly rational agents

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 66, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 221-237

  Kagel, John H ^a   Levin, Dan ^a  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Dynamic Vickrey (Ausubel) auction; Implementation; Mechanism design; Multi unit auctions; Static Vickrey auction

Indexed keywords

EID: 64749113187     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.06.002     Document Type: Article

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