Cooperation and evolutionary dynamics in the public goods game with institutional incentives

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 299, Issue , 2012, Pages 144-151

  Cressman, Ross ^a   Song, Jie Wen ^b,c   Zhang, Bo Yu ^d   Tao, Yi ^c  

^a WILFRID LAURIER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b BEIJING NORMAL UNIVERSITY   (China)

^c INSTITUTE OF ZOOLOGY   (China)

^d UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

Author keywords

Adaptive dynamics; Cooperation; Public goods game; Replicator equation; Reward and punishment

Indexed keywords

GAME THEORY; INCENTIVE; NUMERICAL MODEL; PUBLIC GOODS;

ADAPTATION; ANALYTIC METHOD; ARTICLE; COOPERATION; HEALTH PROMOTION; MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS; MATHEMATICAL MODEL; MOLECULAR DYNAMICS; MOLECULAR EVOLUTION; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PROBABILITY; PUBLIC GOODS GAME; PUNISHMENT; REWARD; SIMULATION;

BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; GAME THEORY; GROUP PROCESSES; HUMANS; MODELS, GENETIC; PUNISHMENT; REWARD;

EID: 84857920536     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: 10958541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.07.030     Document Type: Article

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