Nonpoint Source Pollution When Polluters Might Cooperate

B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy

Volumn 5, Issue 1, 2005, Pages

  Millock, Katrin ^a   Salanié, François ^b  

^a CNRS   (France)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TOULOUSE CAPITOLE   (France)

Author keywords

ambient tax; cooperation; environmental regulation; group moral hazard; incomplete information

Indexed keywords

EID: 84857914457     PISSN: None     EISSN: 19351682     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1515/1538-0653.1233     Document Type: Conference Paper

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