Regulating pollution with endogenous monitoring

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volumn 44, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 221-241

  Millock, Katrin ^a   Sunding, David ^b   Zilberman, David ^b  

^a Centre International de Recherche sur lEnvironnement et le Developpement   (France)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC INSTRUMENT; EMISSION CONTROL; ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; POLLUTION MONITORING; POLLUTION TAX; REGULATORY APPROACH;

EID: 0036734880     PISSN: 00950696     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeem.2001.1208     Document Type: Article

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