Managerial agency and bond covenants

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 23, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 1120-1148

  Chava, Sudheer ^a   Kumar, Praveen ^b   Warga, Arthur ^b  

^a TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77951213955     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhp072     Document Type: Article

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