Disclosing the president's role in rulemaking: A critique of the reform proposals

Catholic University Law Review

Volumn 60, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 1003-1044

  Johnson, Stephen M ^a  

^a MERCER UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84855215838     PISSN: 00088390     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (86)

1. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245,2253 (2001).
2. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 544 (1994);
3. Kagan, supra note 1, at 2247;
4. Lawrence Lessig & Cass Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1994);
5. Kevin M. Stack, The President's Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 264 (2006);
6. Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or 'The Decider'? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 696-97 (2007).
7. Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing 'Political' Oversight of Agency Decision-Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1146 (2010);
8. see also Kagan, supra note 1, at 2248-51 (discussing the Clinton administration's efforts to influence agency policymaking);
9. Strauss, supra note 2, at 701-02 (explaining President Bush's Executive Order 13,422 and its effect of increasing presidential control over agency action).
10. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 3, at 1147-57.
11. See, e.g., Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 6 (2009);
12. see also Mendelson, supra note 3, at 1141.
13. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 1, at 2251-52; Mendelson, supra note 3, at 1159-66; Watts, supra note 5, at 32-45.
14. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 1, at 2377;
15. Watts, supra note 5, at 8-9.
16. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 1, at 2372-73.
17. See Mendelson, supra note 3, at 1164-65.
18. See infra Parts V.F-G.
19. See infra Part V.H.
20. See infra Part V.
21. See Stack, supra note 2, at 264.
22. Mendelson, supra note 3, at 1131-32;
23. see U.S. CONST, art. II, § 3.
24. See Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. 524, 610 (1838).
25. See Stack, supra note 2, at 270.
26. See id. Compare The President and Accounting Officers, 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 624, 625 (1823).
27. See Mendelson, supra note 3, at 1137.
28. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 470 (2003).
29. B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1678 (1975)).
30. See Kagan, supra note 1, at 2329.
31. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 2, at 596 & n.210.
32. Stack, supra note 2, at 266.
33. See Mendelson, supra note 3, at 1129, 1134;
34. see also JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS AND GOVERNANCE: UsrNG PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 153 (1997).
35. Mendelson, supra note 3, at 1134.
36. See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 54;
37. Thomas O. McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 443,462 (1987).
38. See Stack, supra note 2, at 284-90;
39. see also infra Part V.A.
40. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
41. See Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 30, at 53-54;
42. Mendelson, supra note 3, at 1140-41;
43. Watts, supra note 5, at 21-22.
44. See Evan J. Criddle, Chevron 's Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1272-73, 1289-90 (2008).
45. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
46. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1765 (2007)).
47. Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons Are Put in a Jar: Reason and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 21 (2001)).
48. Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 103 MICH. L. REV. 737, 786 (2007).
49. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965, 968 (1997).
50. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Factors Can An Agency Consider in Making a Decisions?, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 67, 67-68.
51. David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 137 (2010).
52. Ernest Gellhorn & Glen O. Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative Law, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 771, 780 (1975)).
53. See Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1296 (1997); (Pubitemid 127418326)
54. PHILIP K. HOWARD: THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: HOW LAW IS SUFFOCATING AMERICA 87 (1994);
55. JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 284 (1989).
56. Stephen M. Johnson, Ossification's Demise: An Empirical Analysis of EPA Rulemaking from 2001-2005, 38 ENVTL. L. 767, 768 (2008)
57. see JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 9-25 (1990);
58. Stephen M. Johnson, Good Guidance, Good Grief, 72 Mo. L. REV. 695, 695-97 (2007);
59. Stephen M. Johnson, The Internet Changes Everything: Revolutionizing Public Participation and Access to Government Information Through the Internet, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 277, 278 (1998); (Pubitemid 128443713)
60. Stephen M. Johnson, Ruminations on Dissemination: Limits on Administrative and Judicial Review under the Information Quality Act, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 59, 159-67 (2005);
61. Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 541-49 (1997) [hereinafter McGarity, Response];
62. Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on 'Deossifying' the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 passim (1992) [hereinafter McGarity, Some Thoughts];
63. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 60-62 (1995) [hereinafter Pierce, Seven Ways]
64. Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossiflcation: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 4M passim (1997).
65. McGarity, Some Thoughts, supra note 217, at 1387-90 & tbl.1;
66. see also Cornelius M. Kerwin & Scott Furlong, Time and Rulemaking: An Empirical Test of Theory, 2 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 113, 124 (1992).
67. Johnson, Ossification's Demise, supra note 217, at 777 n.77.
68. McGarity, Some Thoughts, supra note 217, at 1390-92.
69. Johnson, Ossification's Demise, supra note 217, at 778.
70. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
71. See Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 59 (1998);
72. Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 825-26 (2006);
73. see also Scott Keller, Depoliticizing Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 84 WASH. L. REV. 419, 422 (2009).
74. Miles & Sunstein, supra note 235, at 831.
75. See Stephen M. Johnson, The Roberts Court and the Environment, 37 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 317, app. B at 356-59 (2010).
76. See Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1747-48 (1997); (Pubitemid 127445656)
77. see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron Should Not Be Converted into a Voting Rule: A Response to Gersen and Vermeule's Proposal, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 248, 250 (2007), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocket- part/administrative-law/chevron-should-not-be-converted-into-a-voting-rule: -a-response-to-gersen-and-vermeule%27s-proposal/.
78. Jack M. Beermann, Presidential Power in Transitions, 83 B.U. L. REV. 947, 956 (2003).
79. See Jason M. Loring & Liam R. Roth, After Midnight: The Durability of the "Midnight" Regulations Passed by the Two Previous Outgoing Administrations, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1441,1444(2005).
80. See Jack M. Beermann, Combating Midnight Regulation, 103 Nw U. L. REV. 352, 360 (2009);
81. Loring & Roth, supra note 250, at 1441.
82. Jay Cochran III, The Cinderella Constraint: Why Regulations Increase Significantly During Post-Election Quarters 3 (March 8, 2001) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Mercatus Center at George Mason University), available at http://www.mercatus.org/sites/default/files/publication/The- Cinderella-Constraint(1).pdf.
83. See Loring & Roth, supra note 250, at 1454.
84. See Beermann, supra note 248, at 352 (footnote omitted).
85. Loring & Roth, supra note 249, at 1448.
86. Andrew P. Morriss et al., Between a Hard Rock and a Hard Place: Politics, Midnight Regulations and Mining, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 551, 597 (2003).