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Volumn 16, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 197-243

Who disciplines bank managers?

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EID: 84555188608     PISSN: 15723097     EISSN: 1573692X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rof/rfr010     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (80)

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