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Volumn 30, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 93-109

The depositor behind the discipline: A micro-level case study of Hamilton bank

Author keywords

Account types; Depositor discipline; Insured; Uninsured

Indexed keywords


EID: 33747006199     PISSN: 09208550     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10693-006-8741-4     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (38)

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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.