Market Discipline and Incentive Problems in Conglomerate Firms with Applications to Banking

Journal of Financial Intermediation

Volumn 9, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 240-273

  Boot, Arnoud W A ^a   Schmeits, Anjolein ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^b WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST LOUIS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0008835426     PISSN: 10429573     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jfin.2000.0287     Document Type: Article

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