Dynamic depositor discipline in US banks

Journal of Banking and Finance

Volumn 30, Issue 7, 2006, Pages 1871-1898

  Maechler, Andrea M ^a   McDill, Kathleen M ^a  

^a FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION   (United States)

Author keywords

Bank regulation; Banks; Depositor discipline; Uninsured deposits

Indexed keywords

EID: 33745011418     PISSN: 03784266     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2005.07.010     Document Type: Article

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