Dodd-Frank: Quack federal corporate governance round II

Minnesota Law Review

Volumn 95, Issue 5, 2011, Pages 1779-1821

  Bainbridge, Stephen M ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 84055199914     PISSN: 00265535     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (148)

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