Critical infrastructure protection under imperfect attacker perception

International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection

Volumn 3, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 16-26

  Jenelius, Erik ^a   Westin, Jonas ^a   Holmgren, Åke J ^b  

^a ROYAL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Sweden)

^b Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Game theory; Perception; Protection; Terrorism; Uncertainty

Indexed keywords

BASELINE MODELS; COMPLETE INFORMATION; COMPLEX SYSTEMS; CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION; CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS; GEOGRAPHICAL SEPARATION; MODELING FRAMEWORKS; OBSERVATION ERRORS; OPTIMAL RESOURCE ALLOCATION; PERCEPTION;

COMPUTER CRIME; ECONOMICS; INVESTMENTS; PUBLIC WORKS; RANDOM ERRORS; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; TERRORISM;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 77950923705     PISSN: 18745482     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijcip.2009.10.002     Document Type: Article

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