The origins of social institutions

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 215-240

  Urpelainen, Johannes ^a  

^a Columbia University ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

game theory; institutionalization; institutions; rationality

Indexed keywords

EID: 79955118859     PISSN: 09516298     EISSN: 14603667     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0951629811400473     Document Type: Article

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