Expropriation risk and technology

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 103, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 113-129

  Opp, Marcus M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Dynamic contracting; Expropriation risk; Foreign direct investment; Political risk; Principal agent models; Property rights; Self enforcing contracts

Indexed keywords

EID: 81055157841     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.08.010     Document Type: Article

References (36)

1. Abreu D. On the theory of infinitely repeated games with discounting. Econometrica 1988, 56:383-396.
2. Acemoglu D., Golosov M., Tsyvinski A. Political economy of mechanisms. Econometrica 2008, 76:619-641.
3. Acemoglu D., Golosov M., Tsyvinski A. Dynamic Mirrlees taxation under political economy constraints. Review of Economic Studies 2010, 77:841-881.
4. Acemoglu D., Johnson S., Robinson J.A. The colonial origins of comparative development: an empirical investigation. American Economic Review 2001, 91:1369-1401.
5. Aguiar M., Amador M., Gopinath G. Investment cycles and sovereign debt overhang. Review of Economic Studies 2009, 76:1-31.
6. Albuquerque R., Hopenhayn H.A. Optimal lending contracts and firm dynamics. Review of Economic Studies 2004, 71:285-315.
7. Amador, M., 2004. A political model of sovereign debt repayment. Unpublished working paper, Stanford University.
8. Axarloglou K., Meanor F.G. Taxation and ownership structure in supplying foreign markets. Eastern Economic Journal 2006, 32:685-698.
9. Becker G.S., Stigler G.J. Law enforcement, malfeasance, and compensation of enforcers. The Journal of Legal Studies 1974, 3:1-18.
10. Bernheim B.D., Whinston M.D. Multimarket contact and collusive behavior. RAND Journal of Economics 1990, 21:1-26.
11. Biais B., Perotti E. Machiavellian privatization. American Economic Review 2002, 92:240-258.
12. Bindemann, K., 1999. Production-sharing agreements: an economic analysis. Unpublished working paper, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.
13. Bridgman Benjamin, Gomes Victor, Teixeira Arilton Threatening to increase productivity: evidence from Brazil's oil industry. World Development 2011, 39(8):1372-1385.
14. Bulow J., Rogoff K. A constant recontracting model of sovereign debt. Journal of Political Economy 1989, 97:155-178.
15. Bulow J., Rogoff K. Sovereign debt: Is to forgive to forget?. American Economic Review 1989, 79:43-50.
16. DeMarzo P.M., Fishman M.J. Optimal long-term financial contracting. Review of Financial Studies 2007, 20:2079-2128.
17. DeMarzo, P.M., Fishman, M.J., He, Z., Wang, N. Dynamic agency and the q theory of investment. Journal of Finance, forthcoming.
18. Doerr, G., Kessel, T., 1997. Das Restrukturierungsmodell Skoda-Volkswagen - Ergebnis aus Transfer und Transformation. Unpublished working paper, Wissenschaftzentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung.
19. Eaton J., Gersovitz M. Debt with potential repudiation: theoretical and empirical analysis. Review of Economic Studies 1981, 48:289-309.
20. Greif A., Milgrom P., Weingast B.R. Coordination, commitment, and enforcement: the case of the merchant guild. Journal of Political Economy 1994, 102:745-776.
21. Grossman S.J., Hart O.D. The costs and benefits of ownership: a theory of vertical and lateral integration. Journal of Political Economy 1986, 94:691-719.
22. Harris M., Holmstrom B. A theory of wage dynamics. Review of Economic Studies 1982, 49:315-333.
23. Hart O., Moore J. A theory of debt based on the inalienability of human capital. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 1994, 109:841-879.
24. Hart O., Moore J. Default and renegotiation: a dynamic model of debt. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 1998, 113:1-41.
25. Hellwig C., Lorenzoni G. Bubbles and self-enforcing debt. Econometrica 2009, 77:1137-1164.
26. Kikeri S., Nellis J., Shirley M. Privatization: The Lessons of Experience 1992, World Bank, Washington, DC.
27. Kobrin S.J. Foreign enterprise and forced divestment in LDCs. International Organization 1980, 34:65-88.
28. Kovrijnykh, N., 2009. Debt contracts with partial commitment. Unpublished working paper, Arizona State University.
29. La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A., Vishny R.W. Law and finance. Journal of Political Economy 1998, 106:1113-1155.
30. Lehrer E., Pauzner A. Repeated games with differential time preferences. Econometrica 1999, 67:393-412.
31. Levin J. Relational incentive contracts. American Economic Review 2003, 93:835-857.
32. Li Q. Democracy, autocracy, and expropriation of foreign direct investment. Comparative Political Studies 2009, 42:1098-1127.
33. Ljungqvist L., Sargent T.J. Recursive Macroeconomic Theory 2004, World Bank, Washington, DC. second ed.
34. Rajan R.G., Zingales L. Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists 2003, Crown Business, New York, NY.
35. Ray D. The time structure of self-enforcing agreements. Econometrica 2002, 70:547-582.
36. Thomas J., Worrall T. Foreign direct investment and the risk of expropriation. Review of Economic Studies 1994, 61:81-108.