Democracy, Autocracy, and expropriation of foreign direct investment

Comparative Political Studies

Volumn 42, Issue 8, 2009, Pages 1098-1127

  Li, Quan ^a  

^a TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Autocracy; Democracy; Event count model; Expropriation; Foreign direct investment; Multinational corporations; Regime type

Indexed keywords

EID: 68949156262     PISSN: 00104140     EISSN: 15523829     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0010414009331723     Document Type: Article

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