The role of representation in experience-based choice

Judgment and Decision Making

Volumn 4, Issue 7, 2009, Pages 518-529

  Camilleri, Adrian R ^a   Newell, Ben R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES   (Australia)

Author keywords

Decision from experience; Decision making; Description experience gap; Judgment; Probability; Representation; Uncertainty

Indexed keywords

EID: 73149123127     PISSN: None     EISSN: 19302975     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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