Peer effects and stability in matching markets

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 6982 LNCS, Issue , 2011, Pages 117-129

  Bodine Baron, Elizabeth ^a   Lee, Christina ^a   Chong, Anthony ^a   Hassibi, Babak ^a   Wierman, Adam ^a  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COLLEGE ADMISSIONS; COLLEGE STUDENTS; EFFICIENT ALGORITHM; KEY FEATURE; MANY-TO-ONE; MARKET STABILITY; MATCHINGS; OPTIMAL MATCHING; SOCIAL CONNECTION; SOCIAL NETWORKS; SOCIAL WELFARE; STABLE MATCHING; UTILITY FUNCTIONS;

ALGORITHMS; COMMERCE; GAME THEORY; STABILITY; STUDENTS;

PEER TO PEER NETWORKS;

EID: 80054036356     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-24829-0_12     Document Type: Conference Paper

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