The exchange-stable marriage problem

Discrete Applied Mathematics

Volumn 152, Issue 1-3, 2005, Pages 109-122

  Cechlárová, Katarína ^a   Manlove, David F ^b  

^a P J AFÁRIK UNIVERSITY   (Slovakia)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Coalition exchange stable; Man exchange stable; Matching; Stable marriage problem; Stable roommates problem

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; ASYMPTOTIC STABILITY; LINEAR SYSTEMS; PATTERN MATCHING; POLYNOMIALS;

CLASSICAL STABLE MARRIAGE (SM); COALITION-EXCHANGE-STABLE; MAN-EXCHANGE-STABLE; MATCHING; STABLE MARRIAGE PROBLEM; STABLE ROOMMATES (SR) PROBLEM;

PROBLEM SOLVING;

EID: 26444514566     PISSN: 0166218X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.dam.2005.06.003     Document Type: Article

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