Stability of marriage with externalities

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 37, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 353-369

  Hafalir, Isa E ^a  

^a CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Cooperative games; Externalities; Matchings

Indexed keywords

EID: 55349128194     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-008-0122-9     Document Type: Article

References (10)

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5. Maschler M (1992) The bargaining set, kernel and nucleolus: a survey. In: Aumannn R, Hart S(eds) Handbook of game theory. Elsevier, Amsterdam
6. Maskin E (2003) Bargaining, coalitions and externalities. Working Paper, Institute for Advanced Study
7. D Ray R Vohra 1999 A theory of endogenous coalition structures Games Econ Behav 26 286 336
8. Roth A, Sotomayor M (1990) Two-sided matching: a study in game theoretic modelling and analysis. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
9. Roy Chowdhury P (2005) Marriage markets with externalities. In: Mohan SR, Neogy SK(eds) Operations research with economic and industrial applications: emerging trends. Anamaya Publishers, New Delhi, pp 148-155
10. H Sasaki M Toda 1996 Two-sided matching problems with externalities J Econ Theory 70 93 108