Corporate governance and impression management in annual results press releases

Accounting, Organizations and Society

Volumn 36, Issue 4-5, 2011, Pages 187-208

  García Osma, Beatriz ^a   Guillamón Saorín, Encarna ^b  

^a UNIVERSIDAD AUTÓNOMA DE MADRID   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 80053961824     PISSN: 03613682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2011.03.005     Document Type: Article

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