An Incomplete Contracting Model of Dual Distribution in Franchising

Journal of Retailing

Volumn 87, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 332-344

  Hendrikse, George ^a   Jiang, Tao ^a  

^a ERASMUS UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Cooperative franchising; Dual distribution; Franchising; Incomplete contracting

Indexed keywords

EID: 80053384952     PISSN: 00224359     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jretai.2011.01.003     Document Type: Article

References (58)

1. Alchian Armen A. Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory. Journal of Political Economy 1950, 58(3):211-221.
2. Bai Chong-en, Tao Zhigang Contract Mix in Franchising. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 2000, 9(1):85-113.
3. Baker George P., Hubbard Thomas N. Contractibility and Asset Ownership: On-Board Computers and Governance in US Trucking. Quarterly Journal of Economics 2004, 119(4):1443-1479.
4. Balasubramanian Sridhar Mail versus Mall: A Strategic Analysis of Competition between Direct Marketers and Conventional Retailers. Marketing Science 1998, 17(3):181-195.
5. Blair Roger D., Kaserman David L. A Note on Incentive Incompatibility under Franchising. Review of Industrial Organization 1994, 9(3):323-330.
6. Blair Roger D., Lafontaine Francine The Economics of Franchising 2005, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
7. Bradach Jeffrey L. Using the Plural Form in the Management of Restaurant Chains. Administrative Science Quarterly 1997, 42(2):276-303.
8. Bradach Jeffrey L., Eccles Robert G. Price, Authority, and Trust: From Ideal Types to Plural Forms. Annual Review of Sociology 1989, 15:97-118.
9. Brickley James A, Dark Frederick H. The Choice of Organizational Form: The Case of Franchising. Journal of Financial Economics 1987, 18(2):401-420.
10. Brickley James A., Dark Frederick H., Weisbach Michael S. An Agency Perspective on Franchising. Financial Management 1991, 20(1):27-35.
11. Chiang Wei-yu K., Chhajed Dilip, Hess James D. Direct Marketing, Indirect Profits: A Strategic Analysis of Dual-Channel Supply-Chain Design. Management Science 2003, 49(1):1-20.
12. Cliquet Gerard, Nguyen Minh-Ngoc Innovation Management within the Plural form Network. Economics and Management of Franchise Networks: Franchising 2004, Physica-Verlag, Heidelberg. J. Windsperger, G. Cliquet, G. Hendrikse, M. Tuunanen (Eds.).
13. Combs James G., Michael Steven C., Castrogiovanni Gary J. Franchising: A Review and Avenues to Greater Theoretical Diversity. Journal of Management 2004, 30(6):907-931.
14. Dixit Avinash, Skeath Susan Games of Strategy 1999, Norton, London.
15. Dutta Shantanu, Bergen Mark, Heide John B. Understanding Dual Distribution: The Case of Reps and House Accounts. Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 1995, 11(1):189-204.
16. Ehrmann Thomas, Spranger Georg Successful Franchising using the Plural form. Economics and Management of Franchise Networks: Franchising 2004, Physica-Verlag, Heidelberg. J. Windsperger, G. Cliquet, G. Hendrikse, M. Tuunanen (Eds.).
17. Ehrmann Thomas, Spranger Georg Beneficially Constraining Franchisor's Power. Economics and Management of Networks: Franchising, Strategic Alliances, and Cooperatives 2007, Physica-Verlag, Heidelberg. G. Cliquet, G. Hendrikse, M. Tuunanen, J. Windsperger (Eds.).
18. Fischer Jeffrey H., Harrington Joseph E. Product Variety and Firm Agglomeration. The RAND Journal of Economics 1996, 27(2):281-309.
19. Gallini Nancy T., Lutz Nancy A. Dual Distribution and Royalty Fees in Franchising. Journal of Law Economics & Organization 1992, 8(3):471-501.
20. Gibbons Robert Four Formal(izable) Theories of the Firm. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 2005, 58:202-247.
21. Green Jerry R., Stokey Nancy L. A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts. The Journal of Political Economy 1983, 91(3):349-364.
22. Grossman Sanford J., Hart Oliver D. The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration. Journal of Political Economy 1986, 94(4):691-719.
23. Halonen Maija Reputation and the Allocation of Ownership. Economic Journal 2002, 112:539-558.
24. Hansmann Henry The Ownership of Enterprise 1996, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
25. Hart Oliver, Moore S John Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm. Journal of Political Economy 1990, 98(6):1119-1158.
26. Hendrikse George On the Coexistence of Spot and Contract Markets: A Delivery Requirement Explanation. European Review of Agricultural Economics 2007, 34(2):137-162.
27. Holmström Bengt Future of Cooperatives: A Corporate Perspective. The Finnish Journal of Business Economics 1999, 4:404-417.
28. Holmström Bengt, Milgrom Paul The Firm as an Incentive System. American Economic Review 1994, 84(4):972-991.
29. Kalnins Arturs An Empirical Analysis of Territorial Encroachment within Franchised and Company-Owned Branded Chains. Marketing Science 2004, 23(4):476-489.
30. Klein Benjamin, Crawford Robert A., Alchian Armen A. Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process. Journal of Law and Economics 1978, 21:297-326.
31. Klein Benjamin, Leffler Keith B The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance. The Journal of Political Economy 1981, 89(4):615-641.
32. Lafontaine Francine, Shaw Kathryn L. Targeting Managerial Control: Evidence from Franchising. RAND Journal of Economics 2005, 36(1):131-150.
33. Lafontaine Francine, Slade Margaret E. Incentive Contracting and the Franchise Decision. Game Theory and Business Applications 2001, Kluwer Academic Press, Boston. K. Chatterjee, W.F. Samuelson (Eds.).
34. Lazear Edward P., Rosen Sherwin Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts. The Journal of Political Economy 1981, 89(5):841-864.
35. Lewin-Solomons Shira B. Innovation and Authority in Franchise Systems: An Empirical Exploration of the Plural Form 1999, University of Cambridge and Iowa State University.
36. Liu Yunchuan, Zhang John Z. The Benefits of Personalized Pricing in a Channel. Marketing Science 2006, 25(1):97-105.
37. Lutz Nancy A. Ownership Rights and Incentives in Franchising. Journal of Corporate Finance 1995, 2(1-2):103-131.
38. Maness Robert S. Incomplete contracts and the Choice between Vertical Integration and Franchising. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 1996, 31:101-115.
39. Maskin Eric, Tirole Jean Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts. Review of Economic Studies 1999, 66:83-114.
40. Mathewson Frank, Winter Ralph Territorial Restrictions in Franchise Contracts. Economic Inquiry 1994, 32(2):181-192.
41. Michael Steven C. Investments to Create Bargaining Power. Strategic Management Journal 2000, 21(4):497-514.
42. Minkler Alanson P., Park Timothy A. Asset Specificity and Vertical Integration in Franchising. Review of Industrial Organization 1994, 9(4):409-423.
43. Nöldeke Georg, Schmidt Klaus M. Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A Solution to the Hold-Up Problem. Rand Journal of Economics 1995, 26(2):163-179.
44. Norton Seth W. An Empirical Look at Franchising as an Organizational Form. The Journal of Business 1988, 61(2):197-218.
45. Oxenfeldt Alfred R., Kelly Anthony O. Will Successful Franchise Systems Ultimately Become Wholly-owned Chains?. Journal of Retailing 1968-1969, 44:69-83.
46. Purohit Devavrat Dual Distribution Channels: The Competition between Rental Agencies and Dealers. Marketing Science 1997, 16(3):228-245.
47. Rajan Raghuram G., Zingales Luigi The Governance of the New Enterprise. Corporate Governance 2000, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. X. Vives (Ed.).
48. Reynolds John Economics 101: How Franchising Makes Music for the U.S. Economy. Franchising World 2004, 36:37-40.
49. Rubin Paul H. The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of Franchise Contracts. Journal of Law and Economics 1978, 21:223-233.
50. Schmitz Patrick W. Joint Ownership and the Hold-up Problem under Asymmetric Information. Economic letters 2008, 99:577-580.
51. Sorenson Olav, Sørensen Jesper B. Finding the Right Mix: Franchising, Organizational Learning, and Chain Performance. Strategic Management Journal 2001, 22(6-7):713-724.
52. Spengler Joseph J. Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy. Journal of Political Economy 1950, 58(4):347-352.
53. Tirole Jean Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?. Econometrica 1999, 67(4):741-781.
54. Williamson Oliver E. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism 1985, Free Press, New York.
55. Windsperger Josef, Dant Rajiv P. Contractibility and Ownership Redirection in Franchising: A Property Rights View. Journal of Retailing 2006, 82(3):259-272.
56. Windsperger Josef, Yurdakul Askin The Governance Structure of Franchising Firms: A Property Rights View. Economics and Management of Franchising Networks 2007, Physica-Verlag, Heidelberg. G. Cliquet, G. Hendrikse, M. Tuunanen, J. Windsperger (Eds.).
57. Yin Xiaoli, Zajac Edward J. The Strategy/Governance Structure Fit Relationship: Theory and Evidence in Franchise Arrangements. Strategic Management Journal 2004, 25:365-383.
58. Zettelmeyer Florian Expanding to the Internet: Pricing and Communications Strategies when Firms Compete on Multiple Channels. Journal of Marketing Research 2000, 37(3):292-308.