Lashkar-e-Tayiba and the Pakistani State

Survival

Volumn 53, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 29-52

  Fair, C Christine ^a  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 80053161290     PISSN: 00396338     EISSN: 14682699     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2011.603561     Document Type: Article

References (103)

1. Author experience in Afghanistan between June and October 2007 as a political officer to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan.
2. US Department of Justice, 'Chicago Resident David Coleman Headley Pleads Guilty To Role In India And Denmark Terrorism Conspiracies', press release, 18 March 2010, http://www.justice.gov/usao/iln/pr/chicago/2010/pr0318_01.pdf.
3. Carrie Johnson, 'US Citizen David Coleman Headley Admits role in Mumbai Attacks', Washington Post, 19 March 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/18/AR2010031805407.html.
4. See discussion in Bruce Riedel, Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of Global Jihad (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2011), pp.106-18.
5. See, for example, T.V. Paul 'Causes of the India-Pakistan Enduring Rivalry', in T.V. Paul (ed.), The India-Pakistan Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 3-24.
6. See, for example, the discussion between Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly in S. Paul Kapur, 'Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia', International Security, vol. 33, no. 2, Fall 2008, pp. 71-94
7. Sumit Ganguly, 'Nuclear Stability in South Asia', International Security, vol. 33, no. 2, Fall 2008, pp.45-70.
8. See, for example, Barnett R. Rubin and Ahmed Rashid, 'From Great Game to Grand Bargain', Foreign Affairs, November- December 2008, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64604/barnett-r-rubin-and-ahmed-rashid/from-great-game-to-grand-bargain. For an extensive review of militancy in Pakistan
9. see C. Christine Fair,'The Militant Challenge in Pakistan', Asia Policy, no. 11, January 2011, pp.105-37.
10. This section draws in part from C. Christine Fair, 'Antecedents and Implications of the November 2008 Lashkar-e-Taiba Attack Upon Mumbai', testimony presented before the United States House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection, Washington DC, 11 March 2009.
11. See Yoginder Sikand, 'The Islamist Militancy in Kashmir: The Case of the Lashkar-e-Taiba', in Aparna Rao et al. (eds), The Practice of War: Production, Reproduction and Communication of Armed Violence (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), pp. 215-38
12. Mariam Abou Zahab, 'I Shall be Waiting at the Door of Paradise: The Pakistani Martyrs of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure)', in Rao et al. (eds), The Practice of War, pp. 133-58
13. Saeed Shafqat, 'From Official Islam to Islamism: The Rise of Dawat-ul-Irshad and Lashkar-e- Taiba', in Christophe Jaffrelot (ed.), Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation (London: Zed Books, 2002), pp. 131-47.
14. Abou Zahab, 'I Shall be Waiting at the Door of Paradise'.Personal conversation with Hassan Abbas in autumn 2010
15. See also C. Christine Fair, 'Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for Al-Qa'ida and Other Organizations', Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 27, no.6, November-December 2004, pp.489-504.
16. See 'US Embassy Cables: Lashkar-e- Taiba Terrorists Raise Funds in Saudi Arabia', Guardian, 5 December 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/220186
17. Stephen Phillip Cohen, 'The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan', Washington Quarterly, vol. 26, no. 3, 2003, pp. 7-25.
18. See 'US Embassy Cables: Lashkar-e- Taiba Terrorists Raise Funds in Saudi Arabia'.
19. According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, the Muridke Markaz (centre) comprises a 'Madrassa (seminary), a hospital, a market, a large residential area for "scholars" and faculty members, a fish farm and agricultural tracts
20. The LeT also reportedly operates 16 Islamic institutions, 135 secondary schools, an ambulance service, mobile clinics, blood banks and several seminaries across Pakistan.'
21. See South Asia Terrorism Portal,'Lashkar-e-Toiba [sic] "Army of the Pure"', http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/lashkar_e_toiba.htm.
22. South Asia Terrorism Portal,'Lashkar-e-Toiba'.
23. The author, along with Nadia Shoeb, Arif Jamal and the Combating Terrorism Center, is working on a database of LeT shaheed (martyr) biographies obtained from the group's publications. These observations are preliminary and derived from a database of 708 biographies. Data extraction and analysis was done by Nadia Shoeb.
24. See US Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism,'Chapter 6 - Terrorist Organizations', in Country Reports on Terrorism 2007, 30 April 2008, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2007/103714.htm.
25. Note that many other details in the State Department write-up do not accord with other sources on the organisation. For example, the State Department claims that most LeT recruits come from madrassas, which is not confirmed by the LeT experts cited throughout this article.
26. South Asia Terrorism Portal,'Lashkar-e-Toiba'.
27. See Muhammad Amir Ranan (Saba Ansari, trans.), The A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan (Lahore: Mashal, 2004).
28. Jamaat-ud-Dawa, Hum Kyon Jihad Kar Rahen Hain? [Why Are We Waging Jihad?] (Lahore: Dar-ul-Andulus, 2004).
29. Abou Zahab, 'I Shall be Waiting at the Door of Paradise', p. 138
30. Nadia Shoeb's analysis of the Combating Terrorism Center's LeT database.
31. Abou Zahab, 'I Shall be Waiting at the Door of Paradise', p. 140
32. Shafqat,'From Official Islam to Islamism', p.142
33. Nadia Shoeb's analysis of the Combating Terrorism Center's LeT database.
34. C. Christine Fair, The Madrassah Challenge: Militancy and Religious Education in Pakistan (Washington DC: USIP, 2008).
35. Abou Zahab, 'I Shall be Waiting at the Door of Paradise', pp. 133-58.
36. C. Christine Fair, 'Students Islamic Movement of India and the Indian Mujahideen: An Assessment', Asia Policy, no. 9, January 2010, pp. 101-19.
37. Nadia Shoeb's analysis of the Combating Terrorism Center's LeT database
38. C. Christine Fair,'Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for Al-Qa'ida and Other Organizations', Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 27, no. 6, November-December 2004, pp. 489-504
39. C. Christine Fair, 'The Educated Militants of Pakistan: Implications for Pakistan's Domestic Security', Contemporary South Asia, vol. 16, no. 1, March 2008, pp. 93-106.
40. Ranan, The A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, pp. 296-301.
41. There are no reliable estimates for this, as the Pakistani census does not inquire about religious affiliation. Some surveys have included questions about confessional beliefs, but respondents may not answer such sensitive questions truthfully.
42. C. Christine Fair, Neil Malhotra and Jacob N. Shapiro, drawing from a nationally representative survey of 6,000 Pakistanis, report that 8% of respondents said that they were Ahl-e-Hadith.
43. Christine Fair, Neil Malhotra and Jacob N. Shapiro,'Islam, Militancy, and Politics in Pakistan: Insights From a National Sample', Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 22, no. 4, September 2010, pp. 495-521.
44. This taxonomy is derived from the author's fieldwork in Pakistan from 2002 to 2011.
45. See C. Christine Fair, 'Who Are Pakistan's Militants and Their Families?', Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 20, no. 1, 2008, pp. 49-65.
46. See also, among others, Arif Jamal, Shadow War: The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir (Hoboken, NJ: Melville House, 2009)
47. Ranan, The A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan; Amir Mir, The True Face of Jehadis (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2004)
48. Amir Mir, The Fluttering Flag of Jehad (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2008). For an excellent synthesis of the sprawling Pakistani literature on the various militant groups based in the country
49. see Nicholas Howenstein, 'The Jihadi Terrain in Pakistan: An Introduction to the Sunni Jihadi Groups in Pakistan and Kashmir', Pakistan Studies Research Unit, Bradford University, 5 February 2008, http://www.humansecuritygateway.info/documents/PSRU_JihadiTerrain_Pakistan.pdf.
50. See also 'Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)', Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, 1 July 2009, available at http://jwit.james.com
51. Manzair Zaidi, 'Pakistan's Taliban Warlord: A Profile of Baitullah Meshud', Long War Journal, 30 September 2008, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/09/pakistans_taliban_wa.php
52. Pakistan's Most Wanted: Baitullah Mehsud', Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor, 8 February 2009, available at http://www4.janes.com
53. Rahimullah Yusefzai, 'Profile: Nek Mohammed', BBC News Online, 18 June 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/3819871.stm;
54. Hassan Abbas, 'A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan', CTC Sentinel, vol. 1, no. 2, 2008, pp. 1-4
55. Tribal Tribulations: The Pakistani Taliban in Waziristan', Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency, 13 January 2009, available at www.janes.com.
56. See comments made by US National Intelligence Director John Negroponte, cited in 'Al-Qaeda "Rebuilding" in Pakistan', BBC News, 12 January 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6254375.stm
57. see also K. Alan Kronstadt, Pakistan-U.S. Relations (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 10 November 2008), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/115888.pdf.
58. See, among others, Senator Carl Levin, 'Opening Statement of Senator Carl Levin, Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on Afghanistan and Pakistan', 26 February 2009, http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfm?id=308740
59. Ian Katz,'Gates Says Militant Sanctuaries Pose Biggest Afghanistan Threat', Bloomberg News, 1 March 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aehmlRXgKi2o&refer=home
60. Barnett R. Rubin,'Saving Afghanistan', Foreign Affairs, January-February 2007, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070101faessay86105-p0/barnettr-rubin/saving-afghanistan.html.
61. Vali R. Nasr, 'International Politics, Domestic Imperatives, and Identity Mobilization: Sectarianism in Pakistan, 1979-1998', Comparative Politics, vol. 32, no. 2, January 2000, pp. 170-91
62. International Crisis Group, The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan, Asia Report no. 95 (Brussels and Islamabad: International Crisis Group, 2005), pp. 12, 19-20.
63. See also A.H. Sorbo, 'Paradise Lost', The Herald, June 1988, p. 31
64. Muhammad Qasim Zaman, 'Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalization of Shi'i and Sunni Identities', Modern Asian Studies, vol.32, no. 3, 1998, pp. 689-716.
65. Declan Walsh, 'Pakistan Sends 30,000 Troops for All-out Assault on Taliban', Guardian, 17 October 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/oct/17/pakistan-sends-troops-against-taliban.Author fieldwork in Pakistan in February and April 2009.
66. See Fair, 'Antecedents and Implications of the November 2008 Lashkar-e-Taiba Attack Upon Mumbai'.
67. C. Christine Fair, The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004).
68. See Imtiaz Gul, The Al Qaeda Connection: The Taliban and Terror in Pakistan's Tribal Areas (London: Penguin, 2009).
69. See C. Christine Fair and Peter Chalk, Fortifying Pakistan: The Role of US Internal Security Assistance (Washington DC: USIP, 2006).
70. See Mir, The True Face of Jehadis; Mir, The Fluttering Flag of Jehad; Howenstein, 'The Jihadi Terrain in Pakistan'.
71. During his trial for his participation in the 2008 Mumbai attacks, David Coleman Headley claimed direct ISI involvement in his management. Of course, these courtroom allegations may not be true.
72. Sebastian Rotella, 'U.S. Prosecutors Indict 4 Pakistanis in Mumbai Attacks', Washington Post, 26 April 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/us_prosecutors_indict_4_pakistanis_in_mumbai_attacks/2011/04/26/AFaDLhsE_story.html.
73. Moreover, the director-general of the ISI, Lieutenant-General Ahmad Shuja Pasha, conceded that some 'rogue' elements of his organisation were likely involved. However, he denied that this operation was 'authorised'. Bob Woodward, Obama's Wars (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010), pp. 46-7.
74. Author field work over several years in Pakistan.
75. Jay Solomon, 'U.N. Security Council Sanctions Lashkar Members', 10 December 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122895332614496341.html.
76. See, for example, C. Christine Fair, 'Spy for a Spy: The CIA-ISI Showdown over Raymond Davis', ForeignPolicy.com, Afpak Channel, 10 March 2011, http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/03/10/spy_for_a_spy_the_cia_isi_showdown_over_raymond_davis.
77. The Pew Foundation, 'Opinion of the United States', 2010, available at http://pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=1&country=166.
78. Deadly Blasts Hit Sufi Shrine in Lahore', BBC News, 2 July 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10483453
79. Salman Masood and Waqar Gillani,'Blast at Pakistan Shrine Kills Dozens', New York Times, 3 April 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/04/world/asia/04pakistan.html.
80. See, for example, 'Pakistan's Fight Against the Taliban: The Crumbling Centre', Economist, 13 January 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/17913432?story_id=17913432.
81. Worldwide Incident Tracking System, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, https://wits.nctc.gov.
82. Jamaat-ud-Dawa, Hum Kyon Jihad Kar Rahen Hain?, pp. 42-5. Author's translation from the Urdu.
83. Ibid., p. 43.
84. Ibid., p. 6.
85. Evidence of the organisation's intent to inflame the United States and other international observers can be seen in the banners it produces in (often broken) English.
86. Few Pakistanis can read English and thus these banners are likely intended for Americans and others foreigners.
87. See 'Pakistani Group Under Fire After India Attacks', Associated Press, 5 December 2008, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/12/05/ap/world/main4649577.shtml.
88. Tahir Andrabi and Jishnu Das, 'In Aid We Trust: Hearts and Minds and the Pakistan Earthquake of 2005'
89. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5440, October 2010, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1688196
90. C. Christine Fair, 'Not at the Forefront of Flood Relief', ForeignPolicy.com, Afpak Channel, 20 September 2010, http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/09/20/not_at_the_forefront_of_flood_relief.
91. In fact, after the Mumbai attack of 2008, the Punjab provincial government began managing the organisation's substantial assets in the Punjab and has even placed many LeT/JuD workers employed in various purported charitable activities on its official payroll.
92. The government has also made substantial grants to the organization
93. See 'Punjab Govt. Gave Rs 82m to JD: Papers', Dawn, 16 June 2010, http://news.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawncontent-library/dawn/the-newspaper/front-page/punjab-govt-gavers82m-tojd-papers-660;
94. 'Punjab Govt. Appoints Administrator for JuD', GeoTv, 25 January 2009, http://www.geo.tv/1-25-2009/33491.htm.
95. For a critical discussion of the security of nuclear weapons and command and control arrangements over the same
96. see Christopher Clary, Thinking About Pakistan's Nuclear Security in Peacetime Crisis and War, IDSA Occasional Paper No. 12 (New Delhi: IDSA, 2010)
97. Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, India, Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).
98. This has been the case with the prosecution of LeT operative David Coleman Headley.
99. See Rotella, 'U.S. Prosecutors Indict 4 Pakistanis in Mumbai Attacks'.
100. See Abou Zahab, 'I Shall be Waiting at the Door of Paradise', p. 135.
101. The March 2011 US congressional hearing on this topic generated a storm of controversy, drawing criticism from both liberals and conservatives alike.
102. See David A. Fahrenthold and Michelle Boorstein,'Rep. Peter King's Muslim Hearing: Plenty of Drama, Less Substance', Washington Post, 11 March 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/10/AR2011031002045.html.
103. See Elisabeth Bumiller, 'Gates Says No Sign That Top Pakistanis Knew of Bin Laden', New York Times, 18 May 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/19/world/asia/19pentagon.html.