Islam, militancy, and politics in Pakistan: Insights from a national sample

Terrorism and Political Violence

Volumn 22, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 495-521

  Christine Fair, C ^a   Malhotra, Neil ^b   Shapiro, Jacob N ^c  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^c PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Militancy in Pakistan; Pakistani religious identity; Politics of militancy

Indexed keywords

EID: 77956497371     PISSN: 09546553     EISSN: 15561836     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2010.492305     Document Type: Article

References (78)

1. The most detailed account of this is given by Praveen Swami, India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947-2005 (London: Routledge, 2007)
2. Alexander Evans, ";";The Kashmir insurgency: As bad as it gets," Small Wars and Insurgencies 1, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 69-81.
3. Muhammad Amir Rana (trans. Saba Ansari), The A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan (Lahore: Mashal, 2004)
4. Nicholas Howenstein, "The Jihadi Terrain in Pakistan: An Introduction to the Sunni Jihadi Groups in Pakistan and Kashmir," Pakistan Studies Research Unit, Bradford University, February 2008. http://spaces.brad.ac.uk:8080=download=attachments=748=resrep1.pdf.
5. Rizwan Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan (Burlington: Ashgate, 2005).
6. Inter alia Nicholas Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia (New York: Viking, 2009)
7. Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008);
8. Arif Jamal, Shadow War: The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir (New York: Melville House, 2009).
9. Inter alia Jamal, Shadow War (see note 2 above)
10. C. Christine Fair, ";";Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for Al-Qa'ida and Other Organizations," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27, no. 6 (November=December 2004)
11. Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan (see note 1 above)
12. Sohail Abbas, Probing the Jihadi Mindset (Islamabad: National Book Foundation, 2007)
13. Amir Mir, Fluttering Flag of the Jehad (Lahore: Mashal, 2008)
14. Amir Mir, True Face of the Jehadis (Lahore: Mashal, 2004).
15. For example, ";Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009," which became public law in September 2009. Text is available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:s.01707
16. U.S. White House, White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, March 27, 2009. Text is available at http:// www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2009/03/27/a-new-strategy-afghanistan-and-pakistan
17. U.S. Department of State, Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy, January 21, 2010. Available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/135728.pdf
18. Jacob N. Shapiro and C. Christine Fair, ";";Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan," International Security 34, no. 3 (Winter 2009=2010).
19. C. Christine Fair, The Madrassah Challenge (Washington D.C.: USIP, 2008).
20. "Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009." This law authorizes appropriations for fiscal years 2010 through 2014 to "promote an enhanced strategic partnership with Pakistan and its people, and for other purposes." This law clearly links "radicalization" to socioeconomic and education factors, despite evidence undercutting these assumptions. For example, the law states that it aims to counter "radicalization by providing economic, social, educational, and vocational opportunities and lifeskills training to at-risk youth." (p. 4).
21. Elsewhere it states the U.S. intention to work with Pakistan ";";to support the strengthening of core curricula and the quality of schools across Pakistan, including madrassas, in order to improve the prospects for Pakistani children's futures and eliminate incitements to violence and intolerance" (pp. 4-5).
22. Ayesha Jalal, Partisans of Allah (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 2008).
23. One of the authors acquired the 2002 Gallup data but found the data quality to be very low given the acquisition costs. Few variables for Pakistan were populated relative to other countries included in the effort.
24. C. Christine Fair and Karthik Vaidyanathan, ";";The Practice of Islam in Pakistan and the Influence of Islam on Pakistani Politics," in Rafiq Dossani and Henry S. Rowen, eds., Prospects for Peace in South Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 78-108.
25. Our data will be available once we have completed our currently planned analyses.
26. The 2007 PIPA sample is nearly exclusively urban. Both Pew and Gallup in their documentation note that they oversample urban areas. IRI's samples are nationally representative and Terror Free Tomorrow makes similar claims.
27. CIA World Factbook-Pakistan, updated bi-weekly, no date. https://www.cia.gov/ library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html
28. Fair oversaw this effort with funding from the United States Institute of Peace in consultation with PIPA, Shapiro, and others.
29. C. Christine Fair, Clay Ramsay, and Steve Kull, Pakistani Public Opinion on Democracy, Islamist Militancy, and Relations with the U.S., USIP=PIPA Working Paper, January 2008. Available at http://www.usip.org/ resources/pakistani-public-opinion-democracy-islamist-militancy-and-relations-us
30. Worldpublicopinon.com, "Pakistani Public Opinion on the Swat Conflict, Afghanistan, and the US," July 1, 2009. http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/ jul09/WPO_Pakistan_Jul09_quaire.pdf
31. Pew Global Attitudes Survey, Pakistani Public Opinion: Growing Concerns About Extremism, Continuing Discontent With U.S., August 2009. http://pewglobal.org/ reports/pdf/265.pdf
32. C. Christine Fair, "Who are Pakistan's Militants and Their Families?", Terrorism and Political Violence 21, no. 1 (January 2008)
33. Fair et al., Pakistani Public Opinion on Democracy, Islamist Militancy, and Relations with the U.S. (see note 12 above).
34. Fair also helped PIPA with questionnaire items on the 2009 survey of Pakistanis as well as the 2008 survey conducted by PIPA in association with the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START).
35. PIPA/START, Public Opinion in the Islamic World on Terrorism, al Qaeda, and US Policies, February 2009. Available at http:// www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/feb09/STARTII_Feb09_quaire.pdf
36. United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 2007 Data, http://hdrstats.undp.org/buildtables/#
37. Population Council, Adolescents and Youth in Pakistan 2001-02: A Nationally Representative Survey (New York, Islamabad: Population Council, July 2003). www.popcouncil. net/projects/TA_PakNationalSurvey.html
38. Balochistan, for example, is the largest province geographically accounting for 44 percent of Pakistan's entire landmass of 796,096 sq. km. yet, it accounts for a mere five percent of Pakistan's population. Combined with this small population Balochistan is also one of the most ethnically and economically diverse provinces in Pakistan. While Baloch are the largest ethnic group, there are substantial populations of Pashtuns, Brahvis, Sindhis, Punjabis, Saraikhis, Makranis (of African descent), and numerous ethnic minorities including Sikhs, Hindus, and Parsees. Many of these groups are geographically clustered resulting in a "clumpy" distribution of groups.
39. Graham Kalton and Steven Heeringa, eds., Leslie Kish Selected Papers (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2003) especially pages 35-124
40. Peter McBurney, "On Transferring Statistical Techniques Across Cultures: The Kish Grid," Current Anthropology 29, no. 2 (April 1988): 323-325.
41. Pakistan's education system has five stages. The first is primary education which is the first five years of schooling, typically for children from ages 5 to 9. The second is a middle stage covering grades six through 8 typically for children aged 10-12. Secondary education is a two-year program for grades nine and ten for students between 13 and 14 years of age. Students who have attained ten years of education and who pass a standardized exam receive matriculation certificates and are often called "matrics." Upon becoming matrics, students can continue to intermediate colleges which provide the 11th and 12th year of education whichleads to an F.A. diploma in arts or an F.S. in science. This is typically called "10{thorn}2" in Pakistan. A fifth stage encompasses college and university programs, which culminate in baccalaureate, professional, master's, and doctorate degrees.
42. For more information see, "Pakistan-education overview." http://education.stateuniversity.com/pages/1143/Pakistan- EDUCATIONAL-SYSTEM-OVERVIEW.html#ixzz0SPDDasXF
43. For education statistics, see Pakistan Population Census Organization, ";";Population by Level of Education and Sex." http://www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/pco/statistics/pop_ education/pop_education_sex.html
44. Women were by no means the only enumerators unfamiliar with these concepts; however, all else equal they were less likely than male counterparts to be acquainted with these issues.
45. Fair, The Madrassah Challenge (see note 6 above).
46. This percentage of Shia is worrisome. It is generally believed that Shia comprise as much as 20 percent. (See for example the CIA World Fact Book, Pakistan, last updated April 5, 2010. https:/www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html). However, this is based upon estimates drawn from the last colonial census of Pakistan. Since independence, Pakistan has not included this item in its census. Moreover, it excludes the Northern Areas where many Shia reside. This suggests that within the four provinces, Shia are fewer in number than previously believed or respondents are not answering this question truthfully.
47. It is also possible that they answered in this way as a form of satisficing in that respondents may not have wanted to admit to holding beliefs that divide the umma. This would likely be the case if non-Pakistanis and non-Muslims were enumerators. There is no compelling reason to believe that respondents demurred from answering this question when posed by Muslim Pakistanis. But it a possibility that we cannot rule out.
48. See S. V. R. Nasr, "The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: The Changing Role of Islamism and the Ulama in Society and Politics," Modern Asian Studies 34, no. 1 (2000): 139-180
49. Vali Nasr, "International Politics, Domestic Imperatives, and Identity Mobilization," Comparative Politics 30, no. 2 (January 2000): 171-190
50. Muhammad Qasim Zaman, "Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalization of Shi'i and Sunni Identities," Modern Asian Studies 32, no. 3 (1998): 689-716.
51. See International Crisis Group, The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan, Asia Report N̊ 95, 18 April 2005. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3374l=1
52. It should be stressed that there is no consistent data that suggests that greater religiosity or piety predicts increased support for Islamist militancy writ large. Shapiro and Fair, "Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan" (see note 5 above).
53. Author fieldwork in Afghanistan in 2007, 2008, and 2009. Conversations with U.S. Department of Defense officials in April 2010.
54. Inter alia Jamal, Shadow War (see note 2 above)
55. Fair, "Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for Al-Qa'ida and Other Organizations" (see note 3 above);
56. Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan (see note 1 above)
57. Abbas, Probing the Jihadi Mindset (see note 3 above)
58. Mir, Fluttering Flag of the Jehad and Mir, True Face of the Jehadis (see note 3 above).
59. These differences are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.
60. However, the 2007 USIP=PIPA survey found that Pakistanis tend to be poorly informed of the activity of the various jihadi groups operating in and from Pakistan. Few believed that they attack civilians. (Indeed the same poll of urban Pakistanis overwhelmingly rejected attacks against civilians in a variety of scenarios.) In that survey, respondents were asked whether Jaish-e-Mohammad, Hizbol Mujahideen, or Lashkar-e-Taiba "has intentionally targeted civilians in attacks" in Kashmir or "has never intentionally targeted civilians." While a majority declined to answer the question, a miniscule 6 percent believed that they did so attack civilians and 40-42 percent (depending upon the group) believed that they have never did so.
61. See C. Christine Fair, Clay Ramsay, and Steve Kull, Pakistani Public Opinion on Democracy, Islamist Militancy, and Relations with the U.S., USIP= PIPA Working Paper, January 2008. http://www.usip.org/resources/pakistani-publicopinion- democracy-islamist-militancy-and-relations-us
62. See various polls from Terror Free Tomorrow on Pakistan, including Terror Free Tomorrow, "Results of a New Nationwide Public Opinion Survey of Pakistan before the February 18th Elections," January 2008, http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/upimagestft/TFT%20Pakistan%20Poll%20Report.pdf
63. ";";Results of a New Nationwide Public Opinion Survey of Pakistan before the June 2008 Pakistani By-Elections," June 2008, http://www. terrorfreetomorrow.org/upimagestft/PakistanPollReportJune08.pdf
64. C. Christine Fair, Clay Ramsay, Steve Kull, "Pakistani Public Opinion on Democracy, Islamist Militancy, and Relations with the U.S." (Washington D.C.: USIP=PIPA, January 7, 2008).
65. Paula R. Newberg, Judging the State: Courts and Constitutional Polities in Pakistan (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 1995)
66. Zulfikar Khalid Maluka, The Myth of Constitutionalism in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford Press University, 1995).
67. Mohammad A. Qadeer, Pakistan: Social and Cultural Transformations in a Muslim Nation (London: Routledge, 2005)
68. Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power (Oxford: OUP, 2001)
69. Hassan Askari Rizvi, Military, State and Society in Pakistan (London: Palgrave, 2000), 170.
70. Rizvi, Military, State and Society in Pakistan (see note 35 above), 171-172.
71. See Charles H. Kennedy, "Islamization in Pakistan: Implementation of the Hudood Ordinances," Asian Survey 28, no. 3 (March 1988): 307-316.
72. While the term "Sharia" was used in the Pakistani press, the legal system that was proposed involved including Islamist jurists within established courts. It is likely because this did not go far enough along the Sharia agenda that militants eventually revoked support, broke the peace deal, and pushed on with further offensives and territorial seizures.
73. International Republican Institute, IRI Index: Pakistan Public Opinion Survey March 7-30, May 11, 2009. http://www.iri.org/newsreleases/2009-05-11-Pakistan.asp
74. Pakistanis have long held that the internal border separating the Federally Administered Areas, which is not subject to Pakistani law, is an important demarcation separating the "uncivilized" world of the tribal areas and the "civilized" world of the "settled areas," subject to Pakistani law. An interior barrier for many Punjabis in particular is the Indus river, that separates the Pashtun areas of the Northwest Frontier Province from the Punjab, which is the "strategic" heartland of Pakistan. Buner sits dangerously close on this border. The inroads into Buner likely did much to convince Pakistanis that the Pakistani Taliban would not stop at the boundary of the Northwest Frontier Province. C. Christine Fair, "Pakistan's Own War on Terror: What the Pakistani Public Thinks," Columbia Journal of International Affairs, Fall=Winter issue.
75. C. Christine Fair, ";";Pakistan's Own War on Terror: What the Pakistani Public Thinks," Columbia Journal of International Affairs, Fall=Winter issue
76. International Republican Institute, IRI Index: Pakistan Public Opinion Survey, July 15 - August 7, 2009, October 1, 2009. http://www.iri.org/mena/pakistan/pdfs/2009_October_1_Survey_of_Pakistan_ Public_Opinion_July_15-August_7_2009.pdf
77. World Public Opinion.org, Pakistani Public Opinion on the Swat Conflict, Afghanistan, and the US (Washington D.C.: PIPA, July 1, 2009).
78. Unfortunately, IRI changed the question in July 2009 rendering it incomparable to previous surveys. In July 2009, IRI asked respondents whether or not they support the army fighting specifically in Malakand Division only as opposed to NWFP and FATA.