Ten years of instability in a nuclear South Asia

International Security

Volumn 33, Issue 2, 2008, Pages

  Kapur, S Paul ^a,b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 55749109389     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: 15314804     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.2008.33.2.71     Document Type: Article

References (144)

1. For optimistic arguments, see Kenneth N. Waltz, "For Better: Nuclear Weapons Preserve an Imperfect Peace," in Scott D. Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003), p. 117;
2. K. Subrahmanyam, "India and the International Nuclear Order," in D.R. SarDesai and Raju G.C. Thomas, eds., Nuclear India in the Twenty-first Century (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 83;
3. and John J. Mearsheimer, "Here We Go Again," New York Times, May 17, 1998.
4. For pessimistic arguments, see Scott D. Sagan, "For Worse: Till Death Do Us Part," in Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, pp. 106-107;
5. P.R. Chari, "Nuclear Restraint, Nuclear Risk Reduction, and the Security-Insecurity Paradox in South Asia," in Michael Krepon and Chris Gagné, eds., The Stability-Instability Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and Brinksmanship in South Asia, Report No. 38 (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, June 2001), p. 16;
6. and Kanti Bajpai, "The Fallacy of an Indian Deterrent," in Amitabh Mattoo, ed., India's Nuclear Deterrent: Pokhran II and Beyond (New Delhi: Har-Anand, 1999), pp. 150-188.
7. Sumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 9.
8. By "full-scale" conventional conflict, I mean a conflict that involves states' regular militaries, crosses official international boundaries, and is great enough to threaten the loser with catastrophic defeat.
9. By "limited" war, I mean a conflict resulting in at least 1,000 battle deaths that involves guerrillas, proxy forces, or states' regular militaries, but does not cross official international boundaries on a scale sufficient to threaten the loser with catastrophic defeat.
10. On the Sikh insurgency, see Paul Wallace, "Political Violence and Terrorism in India: The Crisis of Identity," in Martha Crenshaw, ed., Terrorism in Context (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1995), pp. 352-409.
11. See Sumit Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997);
12. and Sumantra Bose, Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003).
13. In the twenty-five-year period between independence and the end of the Bangladesh conflict, India and Pakistan fought three wars: in 1948, 1965, and 1971.
14. See V.P. Malik, Kargil: From Surprise to Victory (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2006);
15. Kargil Review Committee, From Surprise to Reckoning (New Delhi: Sage, 2000);
16. Amarinder Singh, A Ridge Too Far: War in the Kargil Heights, 1999 (New Delhi: Motibagh Palace, 2001);
17. Y.M. Bammi, Kargil, 1999: The Impregnable Conquered (Noida, India: Gorkha, 2002);
18. and Ashok Krishna, "The Kargil War," in Krishna and P.R. Chari, eds., Kargil: The Tables Turned (New Delhi: Manohar, 2001), pp. 77-138.
19. The period from the late 1980s until 1998 is often referred to as an "opaque" or "de facto" nuclear period. During these years, India and Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons, but probably could have produced them if necessary. See S. Paul Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2007);
20. and Devin T. Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998).
21. See Bose, Kashmir
22. and Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir
23. Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent, p. 104;
24. and Husain Haqqani, "The Role of Islam in Pakistan's Future," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Winter 2004/05), p. 90.
25. Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent, pp. 104-105.
26. Benazir Bhutto, interview by author, August 2004.
27. Shireen M. Mazari, interview by author, Islamabad, Pakistan, April 2004;
28. and Shireen M. Mazari, "Kashmir: Looking for Viable Options," Defence Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2 (February-March 1999), http://defencejournal.com/feb-mar99/kashmir-viable.htm.
29. Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), p. 92.
30. See V.R. Raghavan, Siachen: Conflict without End (New Delhi: Viking, 2002).
31. Bhutto, interview by author.
32. President Pervez Musharraf, interview by author, Rawalpindi, Pakistan, April 2004. Note that Musharraf maintained that local mujahideen had executed the Kargil operation, with Pakistan Army forces becoming involved only after India began its counterattack.
33. Jalil Jilani, interview by author, Islamabad, Pakistan, April 2004. Unlike Musharraf, Jilani conceded that Pakistan Army troops had launched the Kargil incursions.
34. Ibid.
35. Pakistan's nuclear capacity was not the only factor that emboldened its leaders to undertake the Kargil operation. The Pakistanis believed that retaking the Kargil heights would be prohibitively difficult for India. And they hoped that the international community would accept the Kargil operation, given Pakistan's perilous position vis-à-vis a conventionally powerful, newly nuclear India. On Pakistani tactical considerations, see Sardar F.S. Lodi, "India's Kargil Operations: An Analysis," Defence Journal, Vol. 3, No. 10 (November 1999), pp. 2-3;
36. Shireen M. Mazari, "Re-examining Kargil," Defence Journal, Vol. 3, No. 11 (June 2000), pp. 44-46;
37. Javed Nasir, "Calling the Indian Army Chief's Bluff," Defence Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2 (February-March 1999), p. 25;
38. Mirza Aslam Beg, "Kargil Withdrawal and 'Rogue' Army Image," Defence Journal, Vol. 3, No. 8 (September 1999), pp. 8-11;
39. Ayaz Ahmed Khan, "Indian Offensive in the Kargil Sector," Defence Journal, Vol. 3, No. 5 (June 1999), pp. 7-8;
40. and Shaukat Qadir, "An Analysis of the Kargil Conflict, 1999," Royal United Service Institution Journal, Vol. 147, No. 2 (April 2002), pp. 2-3.
41. On international opinion, see Ganguly, Conflict Unending, p. 122;
42. Ashley J. Tellis, C. Christine Fair, and Jamison Jo Medby, Limited Conflicts under the Nuclear Umbrella: Indian and Pakistani Lessons from the Kargil Crisis (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2001), p. 38;
43. Mirza Aslam Beg, "Deterrence, Defence, and Development," Defence Journal, Vol. 3, No. 6 (July 1999), pp. 4-6;
44. and Ejaz Haider, Friday Times editor, interview by author, Lahore, Pakistan, April 2004.
45. Mazari, interview by author; Mazari, "Kashmir: Looking for Viable Options," p. 64;
46. and Shireen M. Mazari, "Low-Intensity Conflicts: The New War in South Asia," Defence Journal, Vol. 3, No. 6 (July 1999), p. 41.
47. Ganguly and Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry, p. 191.
48. Rajesh M. Basrur, Minimum Deterrence and India's Nuclear Security (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006), pp. 73-74;
49. and Ganguly and Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry, pp. 160-162.
50. V.P. Malik, interview by author, New Delhi, India, April 2004. On India's battle for international opinion, see also Maleeha Lodhi, "The Kargil Crisis: Anatomy of a Debacle," Newsline (Karachi), July 1999, pp. 30-36;
51. Tellis, Fair, and Medby, Limited Conflicts under the Nuclear Umbrella, pp. 21-28;
52. and Irfan Husain, "Kargil: The Morning After," Dawn (Karachi), April 29, 2000.
53. Gopalaswami Parthasarathy, interviews by author, New Delhi, India, August 2004 and December 2007.
54. Malik, interview by author.
55. Brajesh Mishra, interview by author, New Delhi, India, May 2005.
56. George Fernandes, interview by author, New Delhi, India, August 2004.
57. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, interview by author, New Delhi, India, June 2006.
58. Malik, interview by author.
59. Although Indian leaders' accounts could be seen as self-serving, it would be equally beneficial for them to claim that they never considered crossing the LoC during the Kargil operation. This would insulate them from the charge that they were deterred from horizontal escalation by Pakistan's nuclear capacity and would help to promote the reputation for restraint that the Indians desire. Also, Indian leaders do not completely dismiss the deterrent effects of Pakistani nuclear weapons; they admit to having ruled out full-scale war during the Kargil conflict because of Pakistan's nuclear capacity. Thus it is likely that if they had been similarly deterred from crossing the LoC, Indian leaders would be willing to acknowledge it.
60. See S. Paul Kapur, "Nuclear Proliferation, the Kargil Conflict, and South Asian Security," Security Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Autumn 2003), P. 99. Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai, director of the Pakistan Army's Strategic Plans Division, specified loss of "a large part of [Pakistani] territory" as grounds for the use of nuclear weapons. See Paolo Cotta-Ramusino and Maurizio Martellini, "Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability, and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan," Laundau Network, http://www.mi.infn.it/ ~landnet/Doc/pakistan.pdf (updated February 11, 2002).
61. For detailed discussions of the 2001-02 crisis, see V.K. Sood and Pravin Sawhney, Operation Parakram: The War Unfinished (New Delhi: Sage, 2003);
62. Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon, "U.S. Crisis Management in South Asia's Twin Peaks Crisis," Report No. 57 (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, September 2006);
63. and Sumit Ganguly and Michael R. Kraig, "The 2001-2002 Indo-Pakistani Crisis: Exposing the Limits of Coercive Diplomacy," Security Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Summer 2005).
64. See "President of Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf's Address to the Nation," Islamabad, January 12, 2002, http://www.millat.com/president/ 1020200475758AMword%20file.pdf; Alan Sipress and Rajiv Chandrasekaran, "Powell 'Encouraged' by India Visit," Washington Post, January 19, 2002;
65. Robert Marquand, "Powell Tiptoes Indo-Pak Divide," Christian Science Monitor, January 18, 2002;
66. and Susan Milligan, "India-Pakistan Standoff Easing, Powell Says," Boston Globe, January 18, 2002.
67. Mishra, interview by author; and Sood and Sawhney, Operation Parakram, p. 80.
68. The victims were mostly women and children, the family members of Indian military personnel. See Raj Chengappa and Shishir Gupta, "The Mood to Hit Back," India Today, May 27, 2002, pp. 27-30.
69. Celia W. Dugger and Thom Shanker, "India Sees Hope as Pakistan Halts Kashmir Militants," New York Times, June 9, 2002.
70. Mishra, interview by author. See also Rahul Bedi and Anton La Guardia, "India Ready for 'Decisive Battle,'" Daily Telegraph, May 23, 2002;
71. Fahran Bokhari and Edward Luce, "Western Pressure Brings Easing of Kashmir Tension," Financial Times, June 8, 2002;
72. C. Raja Mohan, "Musharraf Vows to Stop Infiltration: Armitage," Hindu, June 7, 2002; Sood and Sawhney, Operation Parakram, pp. 95, 98-99; "India: Fernandes Says Forward Mobilization of Troops Achieved Objectives," World News Connection, November 21, 2002;
73. and "Government Carrying Out Strategic Relocation of Army," Press Trust of India, November 20, 2002.
74. Vajpayee, interview by author.
75. Fernandes, interview by author.
76. Mishra, interview by author. Note that Pakistan did not return the twenty fugitives that India had earlier demanded.
77. Sood and Sawhney, Operation Parakram, pp. 80, 82, 87;
78. V. Sudarshan and Ajith Pillai, "Game of Patience," Outlook (Mumbai), May 27, 2002; and retired Indian generals, interviews by author, New Delhi, India, August 2004.
79. See, for example, Ganguly and Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry, p. 170;
80. and Basrur, Minimum Deterrence, pp. 94-99.
81. V.K. Sood, interview by author, New Delhi, India, August 2004.
82. This is not to argue that Islamabad was directly involved in the parliament and Kaluchak operations. My point, rather, is that Pakistan nurtured the militant groups behind these and other anti-Indian attacks as part of its strategy of low-intensity conflict in Kashmir. This strategy, in turn, was facilitated by Pakistani nuclear weapons, which insulated Pakistan from all-out Indian retaliation and attracted international attention. Thus the 2001-02 attacks fit a broad pattern of violence stretching back to the late 1980s and were closely linked to Pakistan's nuclear capacity.
83. See, for example, V.R. Raghavan, "Nuclear Deterrence: An Indian Perspective," presentation at "The Future of Nuclear Deterrence in the North Atlantic Alliance" conference, West Sussex, United Kingdom, October 2006, http://www.delhipolicygroup.com/bulletin26.htm; Lawrence Freedman, "Nuclear Deterrence May Still Have a Role to Play," Financial Times, December 1, 2006;
84. Russell J. Leng, "Realpolitik and Learning in the India-Pakistan Rivalry," in T.V. Paul, ed., The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 126-127;
85. and Praveen Swami, "A War to End a War: The Causes and Outcomes of the 2001-2002 IndiaPakistan Crisis," in Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, eds., Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Crisis Behaviour and the Bomb (London: Routledge, 2008).
86. See Sumit Ganguly, "Will Kashmir Stop India's Rise?" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 4 (July/August 2006), p. 48;
87. and "India, Pakistan Agree on Opening of New Bus Link, Trade Routes," Press Trust of India, January 18, 2006.
88. Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report, 2006-2007, pp. 6, 143.
89. Senior Indian diplomat, interview by author, New Delhi, India, December 2007.
90. Raj Chengappa, interview by author, New Delhi, India, December 2007. Chengappa is also the managing editor of India Today.
91. See also Ganguly, "Will Kashmir Stop India's Rise?" pp. 48-50;
92. Robert G. Wirsing, "Precarious Partnership: Pakistan's Response to U.S. Security Policies," Asian Affairs: An American Review, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Summer 2003), p. 74;
93. and Stephen Philip Cohen, "The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Summer 2003), p. 14.
94. Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (New York: Free Press, 2006), pp. 201-204;
95. Stephen Philip Cohen, "The Nation and the State of Pakistan," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Summer 2002), pp. 115-116;
96. Samina Yasmeen, "Pakistan's Kashmir Policy: Voices of Moderation?" Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 12, No. 2 (June 2003), p. 12;
97. Jessie Lloyd and Nathan Nankivell, "India, Pakistan, and the Legacy of September 11," Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 2 (July 2002), p. 281;
98. and Wirsing, "Precarious Partnership," pp. 71-72. Since 2002 Pakistan has received $1.9 billion in U.S. security assistance and $2.4 billion in U.S. economic aid.
99. See Richard A. Boucher, ILS. Foreign Assistance to Pakistan, testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on International Development, Foreign Economic Affairs and International Environmental Protection, 110th Cong., 1st sess., December 6, 2007.
100. Yasmeen, "Pakistan's Kashmir Policy," pp. 12, 15;
101. and Katherine Butler, "Toppling Musharraf: Heat Rises on Pakistani Leader," Independent, February 20, 2006. On the assassination attempts, see Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, pp. 244-262.
102. Vali Nasr, "Military Rule, Islamism, and Democracy in Pakistan," Middle East Journal, Vol. 58, No. 2 (Spring 2004), p. 202.
103. Indian gross domestic product growth jumped from 5.6 percent to 8.4 percent between 1990 and 2005, and is likely to continue above 8 percent in 2008. See S. Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly, "The Transformation of U.S.-India Relations: An Explanation for the Rapprochement and Prospects for the Future," Asian Survey, Vol. 47, No. 4 (July/August 2007), pp. 648-649.
104. Chengappa, interview by author. See also "India-Pakistan: Understanding the Conflict Dynamics," speech by Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon at Jamia Millia Islamia, April 11, 2007; "Pranab for Peace with Pak," Statesman, October 26, 2006;
105. and "Terror Threatens S. Asia: Growth Undermined and Health Care and Education Robbed of Funds, Says PM Singh," Straits Times (Singapore), August 16, 2006.
106. The Diwali bombings killed approximately 60 people on the eve of a major Hindu religious festival. Indian authorities blamed the attacks on the Pakistan-backed militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba. See Amelia Gentleman, "Delhi Police Say Suspect Was Attack Mastermind," International Herald Tribune, November 13, 2005. The Mumbai bombings killed approximately 180 people in railway stations and aboard commuter trains. Indian authorities blamed the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, as well as the Students Islamic Movement of India, for the attacks.
107. See "LeT, JeM, SIMI Helped Execute Terror Plan," Times of India, October 1, 2006. Although the Delhi and Mumbai bombings were more deadly, the parliament and Kaluchak attacks were widely viewed as a greater national affront, as they targeted the foremost symbol of the Indian state as well as the family members of Indian military personnel.
108. Senior Indian diplomat closely involved with the Indo-Pakistani peace process, interview by author, December 2007;
109. senior U.S. military officials, interviews by author, New Delhi, India, December 2007 and May 2005;
110. Michael Krepon, "The Meaning of the Mumbai Blasts" (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, August 7, 2006);
111. Walter Andersen, "The Indo-Pakistani Powder Keg," Globe and Mail, July 19, 2006;
112. and John H. Gill, "India and Pakistan: A Shift in the Military Calculus?" in Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills, eds., Strategic Asia, 2005-2006: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty (Washington, D.C.: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005), p. 266.
113. See Anthony H. Cordesman, The India-Pakistan Military Balance (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2002);
114. Ashley J. Tellis, Stability in South Asia (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1997);
115. and Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent, pp. 50-53.
116. Tellis, Stability in South Asia, pp. 20-21;
117. and Gurmeet Kanwal, director, Center for Land Warfare Studies, interview by author, New Delhi, India, December 2007.
118. Sundeep Unnithan, assistant editor of India Today, interview by author, New Delhi, India, December 2007.
119. Senior U.S. defense official, interview by author, U.S. embassy, New Delhi, India, December 2007. For critical analyses of Parakram, see, for example, Sood and Sawhney, Operation Parakram
120. and Praveen Swami, "Beating the Retreat," Frontline, Vol. 19, No. 22 (October 26-November 8, 2002), http://www.frontlineonnet.com/ f11922/stories/20021108007101200.htm.
121. From 2001 to 2006, the Indian defense budget increased by 60 percent, from $13.81 billion to $22.1 billion. In the coming five years, India is forecast to spend up to $40 billion on weapons procurement, including fighter aircraft, artillery, submarines, and armor. See Jane's World Defense Industry, "JWDI Briefing: India's Defence Industry" (Surrey, U.K.: Jane's Information Group, September 18, 2007); and Heather Timmons and Somini Sengupta, "Building a Modern Arsenal in India," New York Times, August 31, 2007.
122. See also Rodney W. Jones, "Conventional Military and Strategic Stability in South Asia," South Asian Strategic Stability Unit, Research Paper, No. 1 (London: South Asian Strategic Stability Institute, March 2005).
123. This brief overview does not purport fully to explain the complexities of India's Cold Start doctrine. It draws on the following sources: interviews by author in New Delhi in December 2007 with several of Cold Start's intellectual architects, including Vijay Oberoi, former army training command director and army vice chief of staff; Arun Sahgal, head of the Center for Strategic Studies and Simulation, United Service Institution of India, and member of Indian National Security Council Task Force on Net Assessment and Simulation; Gurmeet Kanwal, director of the Center for Land Warfare Studies; and senior U.S. defense officials. See also Col. Amarjit Singh, "Strategy and Doctrine: A Case for Convergence," presentation at the Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation, United Service Institution of India, New Delhi, 2007; Walter C. Ladwig III, "A Cold Start for Hot Wars? An Assessment of the Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine," International Security, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Winter 2007/08), pp. 158-190;
124. Subhash Kapila, "India's New 'Cold Start' War Doctrine Strategically Reviewed: Parts I and II," No. 991 and No. 1013 (Noida, India: South Asia Analysis Group Papers, May 4, 2004, and June 1, 2004);
125. and Tariq M. Ashraf, "Doctrinal Reawakening of the Indian Armed Forces," Military Review, November-December 2004, pp. 53-62.
126. Indian planners will have to overcome a number of organizational and resource-related obstacles before they can fully implement Cold Start. See Ladwig, "A Cold Start for Hot Wars?" pp. 159, 175-190.
127. Ashraf, "Doctrinal Reawakening," p. 59.
128. Oberoi, interview by author. See also "Cold Start to New Doctrine," Times of India, April 14, 2004.
129. Brig. Gen. Khawar Hanif and Maj. Gen. Muhammad Mustafa Khan, interviews by author, Monterey, California, June 2007. See also Shaukat Qadir, "Cold Start: The Nuclear Side," Daily Times (Lahore), May 16, 2004;
130. and Ladwig, "A Cold Start for Hot Wars?" p. 10.
131. Unnithan and senior U.S. defense official, interviews by author; and Kapila, "India's New 'Cold Start' War Doctrine Strategically Reviewed."
132. Kanwal and Sahgal, interviews by author.
133. Senior U.S. defense official, interview by author. See also Ladwig, "A Cold Start for Hot Wars?" pp. 10-14;
134. Gill, "India and Pakistan," p. 266;
135. and Cohen, "The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan," p. 12.
136. Benazir Bhutto's December 2007 assassination is a case in point. See Mark Mazzetti, "C.I.A. Sees Qaeda Link in the Death of Bhutto," New York Times, January 19, 2008.
137. See Yasmeen, "Pakistan's Kashmir Policy," p. 15;
138. Gill, "India and Pakistan," p. 266;
139. and "Jihad and the State of Pakistan," Friday Times (Lahore), March 2, 2007.
140. See also Steve Coll, "The Standoff: How Jihadi Groups Helped Provoke the Twenty-first Century's First Nuclear Crisis," New Yorker, February 13, 2006, pp. 126-139.
141. See, for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, "Waltz Responds to Sagan," in Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, pp. 131-132.
142. See, for example, Scott D. Sagan, "Sagan Responds to Waltz," in Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, pp. 157-158.
143. Scott D. Sagan voices similar concerns about a nuclear Iran. They are, however, based more on organizational shortcomings such as weak state control over military, intelligence, and scientific establishments than on states' rational calculations of their strategic interest. See Sagan, "How to Keep the Bomb from Iran," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 5 (September/October 2006), pp. 45-59.
144. Barry R. Posen, "We Can Live with a Nuclear Iran," New York Times, February 27, 2006.