The educated militants of Pakistan: Implications for Pakistan's domestic security

Contemporary South Asia

Volumn 16, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 93-106

  Fair, C Christine ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ADOPTION CONSTRAINT; FOREIGN POLICY; NATIONAL SECURITY; POLICY STRATEGY; SOCIAL MOVEMENT; STRATEGIC APPROACH;

ASIA; EURASIA; PAKISTAN; SOUTH ASIA;

EID: 42049121108     PISSN: 09584935     EISSN: 1469364X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09584930701800446     Document Type: Article

References (60)

1. See Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (Washington, DC: CEIP, 2005)
2. International Crisis Group, Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military (Brussels, Islamabad: ICG, 2003).
3. Author interviews with Indian officials in New Delhi and Srinagar, India in August and September 2006, and author interviews with terrorism analysts in Pakistan in July 2007.
4. The first suicide attack that took place in Afghanistan occurred on 9 September 2001 when Arab suicide attackers killed Northern Alliance Commander Ahmad Shah Massood. According to data collected by the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, there were no suicide attacks in 2002 and then two and three attacks, respectively, in 2003 and 2004. Unexpectedly, the incidents of suicide bombing escalated throughout 2005, ending with 17 attacks for the year. In 2006 there were 123 actual attacks and (as of 30 June) there were 77 attacks in 2007.
5. See United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan: 2001-07 (Kabul: UNAMA, 2007). The author of this essay edited and co-authored that report.
6. Seth G. Jones, 'Pakistan's dangerous game', Survival, Vol 49, No 1, 2007, pp 15-32.
7. For a discussion of this 'moderated jihad' strategy, see C. Christine Fair and Peter Chalk, Fortifying Pakistan: The Role of U.S. Internal Security Assistance (Washington, DC: USIP, 2006).
8. In July 2007, Pakistani security forces launched Operation Silence to oust militants who had lodged themselves in Islamabad's Lal Masjid and associated madrassah, Jamiah Hafsah. For at least 6 months prior to the operation, 'students' engaged a variety of vigilante activities in efforts to enforce 'shariah' (Islamic law) including attacking shops selling CDs, and capturing and holding hostages alleged prostitutes. They even held hostage several police officers. The Lal Masjid was a well-known redoubt of Deobandi militant activism with ties to groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammad and sectarian groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. Operation Silence enjoyed brief support from the public, which came to believe the students-cum-militants had been allowed to challenge the writ of law for too long. However, as the 'civilian' casualty count rose and as the details of the execution of the operation became known, public outrage began to develop. A spate of suicide and other attacks throughout Pakistan ensued, allegedly in retaliation for Operation Silence.
9. See, for example, Zahid Hussain, 'The battle for the soul of Pakistan', Newsline, July 2007, pp 20-26
10. Massoud Ansari, 'Fight to the finish', Newsline, July 2007, pp 28-34
11. Massoud Ansari, 'Just another ISI node?', Newsline, July 2007, pp 34(a)-35.
12. Note that many of these groups have been proscribed numerous times only to re-emerge again. While we acknowledge that many of the groups now operate under new names, we have retained the names that are likely to be most familiar to readers.
13. Since the onset of sanguinary sectarian violence in Iraq and Iran's 2006 victory in Lebanon, it has been suspected that Iran may once again be involved in inciting anti-Sunni violence in Pakistan. Indeed, throughout 2007 Pakistan has seen a sharp increase in sectarian violence compared with 2006 or previous years. However, the overwhelming preponderance of those attacks has been perpetrated by anti-Shi'a militias. Thus, the allegations of Iran's involvement are not supported empirically at this point.
14. Mariam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy, Islamist Networks: The Afghan - Pakistan Connection (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2004), p 3.
15. See C. Christine Fair, 'Militant recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for Al-Qa'ida and other organizations', Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol 27, No 6, 2004, pp 489-504.
16. According to data on sectarian violence in Pakistan collected and published by the Institute for Conflict Management (a New Delhi-based research institute), as of 10 September 2007 there have been 88 incidents of sectarian violence compared with 38 in all of 2006, 62 in 2005, and 19 in 2004. See Institute for Crisis Management, Sectarian Violence in Pakistan, last updated 10 September 2007, (satp.org/ satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/sect-killing.htm).
17. Andrew Winner and Toshi Yoshihara, 'India and Pakistan at the edge', Survival, Vol 44, No 3, January 2002, pp 69-86
18. Sumit Ganguly and Michael Kraig, 'The 2001-2002 Indo-Pakistani crisis: exposing the limits of coercive diplomacy', Security Studies, Vol 14, No 2, 2005, pp 290-324.
19. Jones, op cit, Ref 4
20. Jason Straziuso, 'Taliban recruiting children for suicide attacks', Associated Press, 15 July 2007, (news.lp.findlaw.com/ap/e/53/ 07-15-2007/f3640051b70e1c0a.html)
21. Syed Shoaib Hasan, 'Recruiting Taleban "child soldiers"', BBC News Online, 12 June 2007, (news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ south_asia/6731389.stm).
22. Lawrence Wright, Looming Towers:AL-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Knopf Publishing Group, 2006)
23. Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror (New York: I.B. Taurus, 2003).
24. Griff Witte and Kamran Khan, 'Arrest in Pakistan spurs hope of stronger effort', Washington Post, 3 March 2007, p A11
25. Malik Siraj Akbar, 'Abdullah Mehsud blows himself up', The Daily Times, 25 July 2007, (www.dailytimes.com.pk/ default.asp?page=2007%5C07%5C25%5Cstory_25-7-2007_pg1_1).
26. See Abigail Cutler and Saleem Ali, 'Madrassah reform is key to terror war', Christian Science Monitor, 27 June 2005, (http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0627/p09s02-coop.html/)
27. The International Crisis Group, Pakistan: Madrassahs, Extremism and the Military (Brussels/Islamabad: International Crisis Group, 2002)
28. Jessica Stern, 'Pakistan's jihad culture', Foreign Affairs, Vol 79, No 6, 2000, pp 115-126
29. Jessica Stern, 'Meeting with the Muj', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol 57, No 1, 2001, pp 42-50
30. Peter Singer, Pakistan's Madrassahs: Ensuring a System of Education not Jihad (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2001).
31. See Mariam Abou Zahab, '"I shall be waiting for you at the door of paradise": The Pakistani martyrs of the Lashkar-E Taiba (Army of the Pure)', in A. Rao, M. Böck and M. Bollig (eds), The Practice of War. The Production, Reproduction and Communication of Armed Violence (Oxford/New York: Berghahn, forthcoming 2008), pp 133-158)
32. Amir Mohammad Rana, Jihad-e-Kashmir Aur Afghanistan [The Jihad in Kashmir and Afghanistan] (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2002). In English Saba Ansari (trans.), A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan (Mashal Books: Lahore, 2004).
33. Sohail Abbas. Probing the Jihadi Mindset (Islamabad: National Book Foundation, 2007).
34. The researchers associated with this effort requested to remain anonymous.
35. This was on oversight in the survey design. We should have asked whether the respondent was the head of household when the person undertook the decisions.
36. This essay only presents partial findings from this study. For all results from the survey, see C. Christine Fair, 'Who are Pakistan's militants and their families?', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol 20, No 1, January 2008, pp 49-65.
37. See, inter alia, Stern 2000, 2001, op cit, Ref 16
38. Singer, op cit, Ref 16
39. Robert Looney, 'A U.S. strategy for achieving stability in Pakistan: expanding educational opportunities', Strategic Insights, Vol 7, No 7, 2002, (ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/sept02/southAsia.asp)
40. International Crisis Group, op cit, Ref 16
41. Christopher Candland, 'Religious education and violence in Pakistan', in Charles H. Kennedy and Cynthia Botterton (eds), Pakistan 2005 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
42. Tahir Andrabi, Jishnu Das, Asim Ijaz Khwaja, and Tristan Zajonc, Religious School Enrollment in Pakistan - A Look at the Data (Washington, DC: World Bank, 8 February 2005), (http://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=667843). Using the Pakistani Integrated Household Survey, they found that full-time enrollments in madaris across Pakistan comprise less than 1% of all students enrolled full-time. When they correct for errors associated household data (e.g. undercounting madrassah students who are not in households) and for population growth, they estimate about 3% of Pakistani children to attend madaris full-time.
43. For several caveats and discussion of the empirical limits of the World Bank study, this argument has been elaborated at length in C. Christine Fair, 'Militant recruitment in Pakistan: A new look at the militancy - madrasah connection', Asia Policy, Vol 1, No 4, summer 2007, pp 107-134.
44. State Bank of Pakistan, Handbook of Statistics on Pakistan Economy 2005, chap 11 'Education and Health', (http://www.sbp.org.pk/ departments/stats/PakEconomy_HandBook/Chap_11.pdf).
45. Also see Population Council, Adolescents and Youth in Pakistan 2001-02: A Nationally Representative Survey (New York/Islamabad: Population Council, July 2003), p 16.
46. For a discussion of the relevant doctrinal differences, see Barbara D. Metcalf, Traditionalist Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs (Leiden: The International Institute for the Study of Islam, 2002), (isim.nl/files/paper_metcalf.pdf).
47. Fair, op cit, Ref 10.
48. Saeed Shafqat, 'From official Islam to Islamism: The rise of Daawa-ul-Irshad and Lashkar-e-Taiba', in Christophe Jaffrelot (ed.), Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation?, (London: Zed Books, 2002/ 2004), pp 131-148.
49. This argument has been elaborated at length in Fair, op cit, Ref 24.
50. The phrase 'quality of terror' needs some explanation. Some groups are able to target high-value, highopportunity cost targets very effectively, including hard military targets, heads of state, high-value civilian structures. These are examples of 'high-quality terror'. Other groups are only capable of pursuing low-value targets, which are typically soft targets such as markets, mosques, and so on. Some groups try to target highvalue targets but do so ineffectively. An example of this would be Afghanistan's suicide bombers, which in nearly one-half of all cases only manage to kill themselves. For a lucid discussion of this issue, see Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, 'The quality of terror', American Journal of Political Science, Vol 49, No 3, July 2005, pp 515-530.
51. See data on Pakistan, ECONSTATS, (http://www.econstats.com/IMF/ IFS_Pak1_67R_.htm).
52. United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, op cit, Ref 3.
53. For a thorough discussion of these selection effects, see Fair, op cit, Ref 24.
54. The author conducted research on Afghanistan's suicide attackers for the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan from June to August 2007. The preponderance of suicide bombers in Afghanistan who come from Pakistan has come from madaris in the tribal belt. These suicide bombers - unlike these Kashmir-based militants - tend to be impoverished, extremely young (as young as 14 years old), impressionable, poorly trained with little or no education. United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, op cit, Ref 3.
55. Andrabi et al., op cit, Ref 23.
56. Tariq Rahman, 'Pluralism and intolerance in Pakistani society: Attitudes of Pakistani students towards the religious 'other'', revised 30 October 2003, paper presented at the Conference on Pluralism, held at Aga Khan University, Institute for the Study of Muslim Civilization, 25 October 2003.
57. For more discussion of this subject, see Fair, op cit, Ref 24.
58. Zahab and Roy, op cit, Ref 9.
59. Jones, op cit, Ref 4.
60. Praveen Swami, 'Mumbai blast, a tragedy foretold', The Hindu, (http://www.hindu.com/2006/07/12/stories/2006071208921100.htm), 12 July 2006.