Feedback and motivation in dynamic tournaments

Journal of Economics and Management Strategy

Volumn 19, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 733-769

  Ederer, Florian ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77953706106     PISSN: 10586407     EISSN: 15309134     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2010.00268.x     Document Type: Conference Paper

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