Which fox in what henhouse and when? Conjectures on regulatory capture

Business and Society Review

Volumn 116, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 277-302

  Wexler, Mark N ^a  

^a SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 80052394067     PISSN: 00453609     EISSN: 14678594     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8594.2011.00386.x     Document Type: Article

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