Do physician remuneration schemes matter? The case of Canadian family physicians

Journal of Health Economics

Volumn 27, Issue 5, 2008, Pages 1168-1181

  Devlin, Rose Anne ^a   Sarma, Sisira ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA   (Canada)

^b WESTERN UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Canada; IV GMM; Physician behaviour; Primary care; Remuneration

Indexed keywords

HEALTH EXPENDITURE; HEALTH POLICY; HEALTH WORKER; INCENTIVE; PRIMARY HEALTH CARE;

ARTICLE; CANADA; GENERAL PRACTITIONER; HEALTH CARE COST; HEALTH CARE POLICY; HEALTH CARE SYSTEM; HEALTH SURVEY; MEDICAL FEE; PHYSICIAN; STATISTICAL ANALYSIS;

ADULT; ATTITUDE OF HEALTH PERSONNEL; CANADA; CHOICE BEHAVIOR; EFFICIENCY; FAMILY PRACTICE; FEE-FOR-SERVICE PLANS; FEMALE; HEALTH CARE SURVEYS; HUMANS; MALE; MIDDLE AGED; MODELS, ECONOMETRIC; OFFICE VISITS; PATIENTS; PHYSICIAN INCENTIVE PLANS; PHYSICIANS, FAMILY; REIMBURSEMENT, INCENTIVE; SELECTION BIAS;

CANADA; NORTH AMERICA;

EID: 50249116104     PISSN: 01676296     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2008.05.006     Document Type: Article

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